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The academic community has largely reached a consensus that medical mal-
practice reform is unlikely to be a meaningful source of health-care cost contain-
ment. This Article suggests that it would be premature to conclude based on the 
evidence underlying this academic sentiment that physicians are universally in-
sensitive to the parameters of medical malpractice law and that liability reform 
has no role to play in the health-care-costs debate. On the contrary, this Article 
demonstrates that the medical-liability system, under particular structures and 
conditions, may indeed have a meaningful connection to health-care spending  
patterns. 
The shortcoming of the existing empirical literature that has likely contribut-
ed to this misconception is its failure to fully appreciate the structure of medical-
liability rules. By viewing the substantive dimension of malpractice law too  
abstractly, the literature has overlooked those features of the system—and of the 
environment in which it operates—that have likely led to the weak connection ob-
served between medical-liability forces and health-care spending. This Article at-
tempts to identify such features, theorizing that the limited empirical findings of 
the existing literature may be explained, in part, by the fact that the present liabil-
ity system sets operable standards of care by deference to customary physician 
practices, which are themselves shaped by financial and other influences that al-
ready encourage excessive spending. On the margin, financial motivations to pro-
vide unnecessary care may simply be crowding out the influence of the law. 
Nonetheless, the theoretical framework set forth in this Article identifies vari-
ous scenarios in which health-care spending may exhibit greater sensitivity to lia-
bility pressures. First, despite any present crowd out of liability forces by financial 
motivations, this model suggests that defensive medicine may become a more no-
ticeable phenomenon should other delivery-system reforms succeed in curbing per-
nicious financial incentives to overtreat patients. Second, this framework predicts 
that spending patterns have the potential to diminish considerably upon the adop-
tion of more-structural reforms to the liability system and the manner in which 
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liability standards are set, as distinct from the remedy-focused reforms—for exam-
ple, damage caps—implemented by legislatures to date. Finally, this Article sup-
ports the various predictions of this model through the presentation of a range of 
empirical findings. Much of this supporting evidence comes from various facets of 
the existing literature, including recent papers by this author. However, this Article 
builds on this empirical precedent by providing new evidence of the sensitivity of 
defensive medicine to the prevalence of financial motivations to provide excessive 
care, drawing on previously unavailable data on health-care costs and implement-
ing a sophisticated natural-experiment design. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Despite all the commentary in recent decades by various in-
terest groups and politicians regarding the link between the 
medical-liability system and health-care spending,1 the academ-
ic community has reached a “loose consensus . . . that malprac-
tice reform is not of much significance for containing costs.”2 
Drawing on various academic studies that have contributed to 
this sentiment, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) issued a 
letter to Senator Orrin Hatch in 2009 predicting that medical 
costs arising from defensive motivations—that is, from fears 
over potential tort liability—would fall by only 0.3 percent upon 
the national adoption of a package of liability reforms designed 
to reduce the expected harm associated with malpractice liabil-
ity.3 The implication is that defensive medicine—the practice of 
 
 1 Republican congressman Tom Price provides a recent example of a contention 
that medical-liability forces contribute to excessive health-care spending, suggesting that 
as much as 26 percent of all money spent on health care (roughly $650 billion annually) 
is attributable to defensive medicine. See Tom Price, Press Release, Gallup: 26% of 
Health Care Dollars Spent to Fend Off Trial Bar (Republican Study Committee, Feb 22, 
2010), archived at http://perma.cc/L2G5-GCUU. These interest group sentiments may 
correlate with (or even contribute to) a lay perception of a substantial link between med-
ical-liability pressure and health-care costs. 
 2 Amitabh Chandra, Anupam B. Jena, and Seth A. Seabury, Defensive Medicine 
May Be Costlier Than It Seems, Wall St J A13 (Feb 7, 2013). 
 3 Douglas W. Elmendorf, Letter to Senator Orrin G. Hatch *2–5 (Congressional 
Budget Office, Oct 9, 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/P7KS-SQE8 (“CBO Report”). 
Such reforms include: (1) a cap of $250,000 on noneconomic-damage awards; (2) a cap on 
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which should otherwise fall in connection with such reforms—
must not be pervasive in the first place. This Article suggests 
that it would be premature to take the evidence touted by the 
academic community to conclude that physicians are universally 
insensitive to the parameters of medical malpractice law and 
thus that liability reform has no potential to reduce health-care 
spending. On the contrary, this Article demonstrates that the 
medical-liability system may, under the right structure, have a 
substantial role to play in the health-care-costs debate, despite 
any consensus that has been reached to the contrary. 
The shortcoming of the empirical malpractice literature that 
has likely contributed to this misconception is the literature’s 
failure to fully acknowledge and appreciate the structure of 
medical-liability rules.4 The literature has simply viewed the 
substantive dimension of malpractice law too abstractly and too 
loosely. It has spoken often of malpractice “pressure,” without 
asking itself what is perhaps the most fundamental question: 
Pressure to do what? This Article demonstrates that this  
omission can be detrimental to understanding the connection 
between medical-liability rules and health-care spending. In es-
sence, this analysis shows that this connection has the potential 
to be substantial, depending, of course, on the structure of the 
liability rules in place.5 
To set forth the groundwork for this discussion, I introduce 
an illustrative model of physician behavior under the threat of 
liability rules. This model begins with a depiction of this dynam-
ic under the current liability structure—that is, a system that 
sets the standards of care clinically expected of physicians by de-
ferring to the actual, customary practices of physicians. A driv-
ing observation behind this model is that those customary  
 
punitive damage awards of the greater of $500,000 or two times the award for economic 
damages; (3) a modification of the traditional “collateral source” rule that would allow 
evidence of income from other sources—for example, insurance proceeds—to be intro-
duced at trial or require that such income be subtracted from awards decided by juries; 
(4) a one-year (for adults) or three-year (for children) statute of limitations; and (5) re-
placement of the joint and several liability rule with a fair-share rule. See id at *2. Of 
these reforms, the one most commonly believed to generate the largest impact on the 
malpractice landscape is a cap on noneconomic-damage awards. See, for example, 
Myungho Paik, Bernard Black, and David A. Hyman, The Receding Tide of Medical 
Malpractice Litigation: Part 1—National Trends, 10 J Empirical Legal Stud 612, 625 
(2013) (“Damage caps are widely seen as the most important med mal liability reforms—
and we confirm that general view.”). 
 4 For a survey of this literature, see Part IV. 
 5 See Part III. 
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practices are likely shaped by a number of influences—financial, 
ethical, and other. Our fundamental inquiry is to ask what role 
liability plays on the margin beyond these additional, nonlegal 
influences on physician behavior. This Article begins by suggest-
ing that, under a custom-focused liability system, the answer to 
that question may be “very little.” 
By deferring to these customary influences, the law is, after 
all, not designed to exert any independent, external influence on 
practices. It is meant only to reinforce the financial and other 
nonlegal determinants of clinical behaviors. In this light, if one 
enacts a reform to this system that simply tries to diminish the 
force of medical liability—for example, a cap on noneconomic-
damage awards (“damage cap”)—one might not be surprised to 
find that practices change to only a minor degree. Any such re-
duction in liability would, on balance, do nothing to alter the 
presence of these additional influences on behavior, which would 
remain in full force. Of course, the law may elevate spending be-
yond this customary baseline when one considers the possibility 
of court error—that is, the possibility that courts will misper-
ceive what customary practices actually are when evaluating 
physician behavior. Physicians may decide to conduct more 
treatments, tests, and so forth, because of a fear that courts may 
expect such behavior. The most critical demonstration of this 
model is that even this uncertainty-driven role for medical lia-
bility may be one that does not substantially induce higher lev-
els of health-care spending on the margin.6  
The intuition behind this claim stems from consideration of 
the vast amount of financial and other motivations that are 
themselves sufficient to increase treatment rates, liability forces 
aside.7 Such nonlegal motivations may have already compelled 
physicians to apply the costly treatments in question to those 
patients who need them the most. To the extent that physicians 
in the affected regions want to increase their treatment rates 
any further—for example, as a result of liability fears—they will 
have to do so with respect to a set of patients that are rather 
healthy and in little need of treatment. In other words, since the 
question is what liability fears will do on top of other influences, 
one must ask how liability fears will impact the treatment deci-
sions of these marginal patients, not how such fears will impact 
 
 6 See Part II.D. 
 7 See Thomas G. McGuire, Physician Agency, in Anthony J. Culyer and Joseph P. 
Newhouse, eds, 1 Handbook of Health Economics 461, 506–07 (Elsevier 2000). 
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the decisions affecting an average patient receiving the treat-
ment (who would have likely received treatment anyway as a 
result of these other influences). Because of their relatively 
healthy dispositions, these marginal patients may pose few 
health risks that would otherwise compel a physician who is al-
ready uncertain about what precisely is expected of her to none-
theless provide treatment. If anything, given the risks associat-
ed with treatment execution itself, liability forces in these 
conditions might compel uncertain physicians to ponder per-
forming fewer, not more, treatments on such patients. 
To put it simply, in an environment generally bent on 
providing excessive care anyway, one might not predict that the 
present custom-focused liability rules will place much in the way 
of additional inflationary pressures on health-care spending. 
Without necessarily acknowledging these structural points, the 
literature to date has largely captured the predictions of this 
model, documenting a weak average relationship between 
health-care costs and treatment utilization on the one hand and 
marginal liability forces on the other.8 It would be misguided, 
however, to end the discussion here. Taking these findings to 
conclude that liability reform “is not of much significance for 
containing costs,”9 as the academic community appears to have 
done, overlooks those features of the above model that actually 
contribute to the diminished marginal role for liability forces. In 
particular, two implications arise from this analysis that chal-
lenge any perception regarding the general irrelevance of  
liability forces. 
The first implication stems from the contextual nature of 
this analysis. That is, this Article suggests that malpractice 
forces could be surprisingly more influential in driving up 
health-care costs in unprecedented environments marked by 
diminished financial incentives to overtreat patients. Quite 
simply, if malpractice pressure is left with little work to do in 
the present market considering that other nonliability-related 
factors are sufficient to push practices to their upper limits, then 
reducing the influence of those other factors may leave malprac-
tice forces with a larger role to play, much as taking away one 
leg of a table may enhance the importance of the remaining legs. 
Accordingly, to the extent that delivery-system reforms and  
 
 8 See Part IV. 
 9 Chandra, Jena, and Seabury, Defensive Medicine at A13 (cited in note 2). 
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other cost-containment initiatives are successful in substantially 
curtailing health-care spending moving forward—as it is hoped 
that they will be—medical-liability forces may take on a role 
unappreciated by the current set of empirical findings.10 Part 
IV.C presents novel empirical evidence using a sophisticated 
natural-experiment methodology that lends support to this pre-
diction, essentially finding that the relationship between liabil-
ity pressures and health-care spending increases as financial in-
centives to deliver more care decrease. 
The second and more important implication of this model 
that demonstrates the ongoing relevance of medical liability to 
health-care spending stems from consideration of the structure 
of liability rules. The discussion thus far has addressed a liabil-
ity system in which physicians are evaluated by reference to 
what other physicians customarily do.11 As suggested, liability 
forces in that system may place little expansionary pressure on 
treatment patterns in equilibrium. With liability fears exerting 
little influence on the margin anyway, it may be natural to ex-
pect that few cost savings will derive from reforms such as dam-
age caps, which simply blunt the harm associated with malprac-
tice liability without necessarily altering the structure of that 
system. When contending that liability “reforms” may be of little 
consequence to spending, such commentators are very likely 
confining their conceptualization of reforms to those of the tradi-
tional damage-cap variety—that is, those reforms that are fo-
cused on liability’s remedies.12 What these commentators over-
look is the possibility that a jurisdiction may reform liability 
rules along a more substantive and structural dimension.  
Indeed, commentators are viewing liability-reform prospects far 
 
 10 Proposed cost-containment reforms that are unrelated to liability are too numer-
ous to list here. For an overview of such reforms, see generally Joseph Antos, et al, Bend-
ing the Curve: Effective Steps to Address Long-Term Health Care Spending Growth (En-
gelberg Center, Aug 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/4LRB-J96J (discussing, among 
other initiatives, implementing payment-system reforms to Medicare and Medicaid to 
broaden bundled payments, expanding pay-for-performance, and reducing payment for 
care of low value relative to cost). 
 11 For a statement of the custom-based liability rule in medical malpractice law, see 
Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T. Hayden, and Ellen M. Bublick, The Law of Torts § 292 (West 2d 
ed 2011).  
 12 See, for example, Leonard J. Nelson III, Michael A. Morrisey, and David J. Beck-
er, Medical Liability and Health Care Reform, 21 Health Matrix 443, 444 (2011) (focus-
ing almost exclusively on the impact of damage caps and concluding that “it is not clear 
that caps will significantly reduce health care costs or that any savings will be passed on 
to consumers”). 
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too narrowly. If the law’s influence is presently muted as a re-
sult of the precise manner in which liability is currently set, 
then why not simply change the rules of the game? That is, why 
not change the way that liability is determined in the first in-
stance? This Article demonstrates that a substantive reform of 
this variety has the potential to shift practices to a new equilib-
rium altogether—one potentially characterized by significantly 
lower health-care expenditures. 
More concretely, this Article considers the impact of an al-
teration to malpractice standard-of-care rules that directly and 
immediately changes the clinical expectations confronting phy-
sicians. For instance, consider a set of heart disease patients 
with severity levels such that physicians would ordinarily per-
form an intensive intervention—for example, coronary artery 
bypass grafting (CABG). Despite such a custom, perhaps it is 
the case that the best scientific evidence to date dictates that 
performing CABG on these particular patients would be unwar-
ranted in light of the risks and costs of the treatment relative to 
the ensuing benefits. Assume that the law retreats from setting 
liability standards according to custom and instead sets stand-
ards of care in accordance with the best scientific evidence.13 Fol-
lowing a reform of this nature, physicians may decide to stop 
performing CABG on all or at least some of these particular pa-
tients. After all, to the extent that physicians maintain this cus-
tom, they may immediately expose themselves to liability over 
the improper use of CABG in these instances. Nothing in the 
above discussion regarding the limited role of malpractice law 
under a custom-focused system would suggest otherwise. At is-
sue above was simply a very specific phenomenon altogether, 
not a general demonstration of the insensitivity of physicians to 
liability. Importantly, in that initial discussion, the clinical ex-
pectations placed on physicians under the law were not in flux. 
Under this new hypothesized shift in liability standards, the law 
now affirmatively expects something different of physicians. Any 
 
 13 Indeed, the evidence-based-medicine (EBM) movement represents such a shift. 
See Carter L. Williams, Evidence-Based Medicine in the Law beyond Clinical Practice 
Guidelines: What Effect Will EBM Have on the Standard of Care?, 61 Wash & Lee L Rev 
479, 481 (2004) (“EBM seeks to shift the focus of physician decisionmaking from experi-
ence and opinion to a more stringent review and application of high-grade scientific  
evidence.”). 
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desire to remain in conformance with the law will directly lead 
physicians to alter their practices.14 
Ultimately, to understand the way in which medical liability 
may still be relevant to the cost-containment debate, it is helpful 
to retreat from any conception of medical malpractice as a nebu-
lous, abstract force looming over physicians. How society struc-
tures that force matters. Liability reforms aimed at altering the 
way in which physicians are evaluated in the first instance may 
be especially influential in reshaping the norms of medical prac-
tices. I note that this is more than a mere thought experiment 
on my part. At least one proposal along such lines has garnered 
notable discussion by various commentators and politicians: the 
provision of liability safe harbors to physicians that comply with 
a delineated set of clinical practice guidelines (CPGs), a proposal 
that is premised on evidence-based medicine.15 To the extent 
that such guidelines are themselves set so as to discourage 
overutilization of medical care, a reform of this nature could in-
deed lead to substantial cost savings. Overreliance on the find-
ings from those studies that have simply evaluated the cost sav-
ings ensuing from damage-cap adoptions may lead one to 
underappreciate the savings possible from substantive reforms 
of this nature. 
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I briefly discuss 
various sources of ambiguity generally surrounding the question 
of physician responsiveness to malpractice liability. This ambi-
guity has largely motivated the empirical literature concerning 
the impacts of medical liability on health-care-utilization pat-
terns and thus serves as a natural place to commence this dis-
cussion. In Parts II and III, I set forth the model of physician  
 
 14 Professor James Blumstein has likewise proposed addressing cost-containment 
goals through substantive, as opposed to remedial, reforms to liability. See James F. 
Blumstein, Medical Malpractice Standard-Setting: Developing Malpractice “Safe  
Harbors” as a New Role for QIOs?, 59 Vand L Rev 1017, 1019–20 (2006) (“[T]he approach 
developed in this Article is designed to deal with the systemic cost-escalation aspects of 
the medical malpractice issue through modification of the process for determining stand-
ards of liability in targeted areas.”). Blumstein likewise raises concerns over the fact that 
liability standards are presently based on custom, when that custom is shaped by finan-
cial and other motivations to overtreat patients. See id at 1021. The analysis in this  
Article expands on Blumstein’s cursory intuitions through a more comprehensive model-
ing of physician behavior in the face of both liability-related incentives and financial 
(and other) incentives, through a more comprehensive modeling of the differing roles of 
remedial reforms and substantive reforms, and by providing empirical support for the 
model’s predictions. 
 15 See Peter Orszag, Malpractice Methodology, NY Times A39 (Oct 21, 2010). See 
also Part VI. 
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decisionmaking described above, demonstrating the manner in 
which liability forces operate in equilibrium with financial and 
other nonlegal forces simultaneously driving physician behavior. 
In Part IV, I support the various predictions generated by this 
framework through a discussion of a range of empirical findings. 
Many of these findings are provided by the empirical literature 
to date. As such, this Article can, in part, be seen as setting 
forth a theoretical framework to reconcile what might otherwise 
appear to be divergent findings in the literature. However, Part 
IV introduces novel empirical evidence to support the first im-
plication of the model discussed above regarding the interaction 
between liability forces and the prevailing financial environ-
ment. In Part V, I discuss various mechanisms that may lie be-
hind the observed responses in clinical behavior to an alteration 
of liability standards. Finally, in Part VI, I address the general 
implications of this analysis for the ongoing cost-containment 
debate. 
I.  AMBIGUITY IN PHYSICIAN RESPONSIVENESS TO MEDICAL 
LIABILITY 
For medical-liability reform to have much of an impact on 
health-care spending, it is necessary that physician behavior be 
somehow responsive to the parameters of the liability system. 
To some, this responsiveness may seem obvious. However, in 
this Part, I discuss various reasons why one should be suspi-
cious of the existence of any such sensitivity in the first place. It 
is precisely this suspicion that motivates the need for careful 
theoretical and empirical evaluation of the effects of liability on 
clinical behaviors, which this Article endeavors to provide. 
To begin, are physicians even aware of how the law expects 
them to behave under certain circumstances? For instance, 
when confronted by a mother in delivery with a precise set of 
risk factors and conditions—for example, a mother in protracted 
labor with a narrow pelvic arch indicating cephalopelvic dispro-
portion—does an obstetrician know whether the law expects 
that she deliver the child via cesarean section or whether a de-
livery via other means (for example, forceps) may suffice? This 
knowledge may possibly come through word of mouth among 
physicians following the outcome of a recent malpractice suit, or 
it may come through communications with their medical-liability 
13 FRAKES_ART_INTERNET (DO NOT DELETE) 3/24/2015  9:45 AM 
2015] The Surprising Relevance of Medical Malpractice Law 327 
 
insurance providers.16 However, it is unclear whether this in-
formation reaches a physician at a helpful enough level to influ-
ence clinical decisions.17 Of course, perhaps all that physicians 
need to know is (1) that liability rules generally expect that phy-
sicians follow the customary practices of other physicians18 and 
(2) what those customary practices actually are. Even in that 
case, though, there may be reason to doubt whether physicians’ 
knowledge is sufficient along both fronts. 
Moreover, even if physicians are aware of the standards ex-
pected of them under the law, it is unclear whether they would 
alter their practices in accordance with such expectations. Given 
that only a small percentage (less than 2 percent) of those who 
are harmed by a negligent medical error actually pursue a mal-
practice claim in the first place,19 physicians may face relatively 
blunted incentives to comply with these legal expectations. 
Throwing yet another wrinkle into this discussion is the 
possibility of inefficiency in the sorting of meritorious claims 
from nonmeritorious claims (that is, those lacking a negligently 
caused injury). To the extent that plaintiffs are frequently able 
to prevail with so-called frivolous suits, the law may be ineffi-
ciently sending weak signals to physicians regarding its  
expectations. Early analysis of targeting efficiency sounded 
some alarms;20 however, more recent—and arguably more  
 
 16 In 2009, I informally surveyed several academic physicians and confirmed that 
they receive information regarding suggested medical practices from their liability in-
surers. To my knowledge, this information channel has not been the subject of signifi-
cant academic research. 
 17 See Bryan A. Liang, Medical Malpractice: Do Physicians Have Knowledge of  
Legal Standards and Assess Cases as Juries Do?, 3 U Chi L Sch Roundtable 59, 90 
(1996) (concluding from a survey that “physicians were ignorant about the common law 
of tort, and their perceptions regarding the legal definition of negligence were clearly 
incomplete and incorrect”). 
 18 See Part III. 
 19 See A. Russell Localio, et al, Relation between Malpractice Claims and Adverse 
Events Due to Negligence: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study III, 325 New 
Eng J Med 245, 247 (1991) (finding, based on a study of medical records and medical 
malpractice claims, that “[t]he chance that an injury caused by medical negligence would 
result in litigation was 1.53 percent”). 
 20 See, for example, David M. Studdert, et al, Claims, Errors, and Compensation 
Payments in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 354 New Eng J Med 2024, 2029 (2006) 
(surveying the early literature and noting that “[t]he findings vary widely, with 40 to 80 
percent of claims judged to lack merit and 16 to 59 percent of claims without merit re-
ceiving payment”). Professor David Studdert and his coauthors contended that these  
early studies suffered from various limitations, including a reliance on the insurer’s as-
sessment of claim validity. See id. In their own investigation, Studdert and his coauthors 
instead relied on the assessment of independent experts. See id at 2025–26. 
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robust—research instills greater confidence in the ability of the 
system to sort the wheat from the chaff.21 
While perhaps even more sources of ambiguity abound, the 
final one that I will note concerns the financial consequences of 
liability for physicians. By and large, even when plaintiffs pre-
vail in a malpractice suit, physicians face few immediate finan-
cial costs.22 After all, physicians are almost universally insured 
for liability losses,23 with coverage that is not typically experi-
ence rated—that is, coverage for which premiums generally do 
not rise notably in connection with one’s malpractice history.24 
Furthermore, liability amounts rarely surpass the limits speci-
fied in liability insurance contracts.25 On the other hand, of 
course, physicians may experience various uninsurable conse-
quences from liability, including reputational damage and psy-
chological costs.26 Depending on the severity of such costs, it is 
 
 21 See id at 2027–28 (finding that over 70 percent of nonmeritorious claims received 
no compensation, while over 70 percent of those claims that involved both injury and 
negligence did). Moreover, when nonmeritorious claims did receive an award, Studdert 
and his coauthors found that payments were substantially lower than those extended to 
meritorious claims (roughly $313,000 versus $521,000). Id at 2028. 
 22 See David Leonhardt, A System Breeding More Waste, NY Times B1 (Sept 23, 
2009) (“If you talk to doctors about malpractice, you come to realize that the root of their 
objections isn’t financial.”). 
 23 This is the case because almost all states require that physicians have liability 
insurance. See Michelle M. Mello, Understanding Medical Malpractice Insurance: A 
Primer *1 (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, Jan 2006), archived at 
http://perma.cc/E8DM-56CA. Moreover, many hospitals require that physicians have in-
surance before they can gain admitting privileges. See id. But see Rachel Emma Silver-
man, So Sue Me: Doctors without Insurance—As Premiums Rise, Physicians Drop Mal-
practice Coverage; What It Means for Patients, Wall St J D1 (Jan 28, 2004) (noting the 
increasing number of doctors who are choosing to cancel their insurance coverage and 
self-insure). 
 24 See Janet Currie and W. Bentley MacLeod, First Do No Harm? Tort Reform and 
Birth Outcomes, 123 Q J Econ 795, 798 (2008) (“Doctors’ premiums are not experience-
rated, but are set at the specialty-area level.”). 
 25 See Kathryn Zeiler, et al, Physicians’ Insurance Limits and Malpractice  
Payments: Evidence from Texas Closed Claims 1990–2003, 36 J Legal Stud S9, S10 
(2007) (finding that 98.5 percent of the malpractice claims studied were resolved with 
payments less than or equal to primary malpractice policy limits). 
 26 See Michelle M. Mello, et al, National Costs of the Medical Liability System, 29 
Health Affairs 1569, 1574 (2010) (“Physicians . . . cannot insure against the psychologi-
cal costs of being involved in litigation. . . . Nor can they avoid the reputation effects of 
being sued. . . . Whether or not they prevail in a lawsuit, physicians anecdotally report 
that these effects occur.”). Knowledge of malpractice cases may disseminate, in part, as a 
result of certain reporting requirements associated with liability. For instance, subject to 
certain exceptions, hospitals, state medical boards, professional liability insurers, and 
certain other entities are required to report to the National Practitioner Data Bank re-
garding malpractice payments made by physicians and other adverse events. See US 
13 FRAKES_ART_INTERNET (DO NOT DELETE) 3/24/2015  9:45 AM 
2015] The Surprising Relevance of Medical Malpractice Law 329 
 
certainly possible that liability fears could shape clinical  
practices. 
This cloud of uncertainty naturally causes one to challenge 
the notion of a physician motivated by the medical-liability sys-
tem. Empirical analysis is evidently necessary to resolve this  
issue. As will be more fully surveyed in Part IV, empirical at-
tempts to confront this question have presented arguably mixed 
results. Studies attempting to elicit the influence of liability by 
observing how physicians respond to remedy-centric reforms 
that attempt to diminish the severity of the present system—for 
example, damage caps—suggest only a modest degree of sensi-
tivity at best.27 However, studies confronting this inquiry by ob-
serving experiences with more-substantive reforms to the man-
ner in which liability itself is determined evidence a more 
substantial degree of responsiveness.28 This disparity between 
the impacts of remedial reforms and substantive reforms creates 
a puzzle of its own: If the latter studies are indeed accurately 
depicting a sensitivity in physician behavior to malpractice 
standard-of-care rules, then how can one explain the modest 
sensitivity found in the damage-cap (and related) studies? Or 
should the findings from the damage-cap studies cause one to 
question the validity of the latter liability-standards-based  
studies? Ultimately, are physicians at least potentially sensitive 
to the liability system, such that it could be reformed in a way 
that will lower costs? These questions animate this Article. To 
help shed light on these puzzles, I set forth a model of physician 
behavior in the next two parts that will demonstrate how liabil-
ity forces—both substantive and remedial—interact with  
nonliability determinants of practices. 
Before turning to this model, however, let us address one 
concern regarding the use of damage-cap adoptions as an empir-
ical tool to evaluate physician sensitivity to the medical-liability 
system. While it is not a goal of this Article to scrutinize the 
methodological foundations of the damage-cap-based studies, 
this Article’s aspiration—to reconcile the findings from the  
 
Department of Health and Human Services, About Us, National Practitioner Data Bank 
(Health Resources and Services Administration), archived at http://perma.cc/Y7NR-943B. 
 27 See notes 56–57 and accompanying text. 
 28 Similarly suggesting greater physician responsiveness to medical-liability forces 
are those studies that assess this relationship not through observational data based on 
actual clinical practices but through surveys of physicians regarding their consideration 
of liability fears when selecting treatments. For a larger discussion of such surveys, see 
note 85. 
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damage-cap studies and the liability-standards-reform studies—
arguably presupposes the empirical validity of the damage-cap 
branch of the malpractice literature. The financial-insensitivity 
observations made above may immediately cast doubt on the 
merits of using variations in the incidence of a dollar cap on 
noneconomic-damage awards as a means of exploring physician 
responsiveness to liability. After all, to the extent that physi-
cians register only reputational or psychological harms associat-
ed with liability, as opposed to immediate financial consequenc-
es, one may wonder how liability reforms of a strictly financial 
sort—for example, damage caps—can be expected to influence 
physician behavior. 
The influence of caps in the face of limited direct financial 
implications of lawsuits stems from the possible influence of 
caps on the likelihood that harmed patients will file malpractice 
suits against their physicians in the first instance. By decreas-
ing the returns of litigation, damage caps may disincentivize 
both plaintiffs and their attorneys from initiating suit.29 Indeed, 
supporting this contention, evidence suggests that malpractice 
claims fall substantially upon the adoption of damage caps.30 As 
such, even if caps may be irrelevant from the perspective of 
those physicians who are sued, physicians in general may regis-
ter a decrease in prevailing liability pressure upon the adoption 
of a cap insofar as such liability limits make it less likely—as a 
result of the reduced propensity of plaintiffs to sue—that physi-
cians will suffer the reputational and psychological harms  
associated with liability. 
 
 29 See Joanna Shepherd, Uncovering the Silent Victims of the American Medical 
Liability System, 67 Vand L Rev 151, 154 (2014) (“In fact, over half of the attorneys re-
sponded that they will not accept a case unless expected damages are at least $250,000, 
even for a case they are almost certain to win on the merits.”). 
 30 See, for example, Myungho Paik, Bernard Black, and David Hyman, The  
Receding Tide of Medical Malpractice Litigation: Part 2—Effect of Damage Caps, 10 J 
Empirical Legal Stud 639, 649 (2013) (finding a 27 to 36 percent drop in claim frequency 
in connection with damage-cap adoptions). Another concern with damage-cap-based 
studies is that they represent only a marginal reduction in liability pressure. To the ex-
tent that physician responsiveness to liability pressure is nonlinear, it is possible that 
the observed responsiveness to caps, even if extrapolated to reflect the most stringent 
conceivable cap, might understate the true response that would be observed in response 
to a more substantial reduction in liability forces. However, with an estimated 27 to 36 
percent reduction in claim rates associated with cap adoptions, it is arguable that the 
influence of these adoptions is more than merely marginal. See id. In fact, Myungho 
Paik’s study considered the phase-in of other non-damage-cap reforms in conjunction 
with damage caps and found that the marginal effect of the non-damage-cap reforms was 
insignificant. See id at 656–58. 
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II.  THE MECHANICS OF DEFENSIVE MEDICINE 
In this Part, I introduce a simple abstract model of physi-
cian decisionmaking in order to demonstrate the contextual na-
ture of the relationship between health-care spending and liabil-
ity forces. This model also illustrates how, on the margin, 
liability pressure may be attenuated in the present environment 
due to the already-excessive pressures placed on medical prac-
tice by other forces—for example, reimbursement-related  
incentives.31 
In order to convey the basic dynamics at issue, I simplify 
this analysis by modeling only a simple treatment-versus-no-
treatment decision on the part of physicians. This is distinct 
from the decision of how much care to take in the administration 
of treatment itself. Malpractice suits may derive from both such 
decisions. In the first instance, one can be sued for failing to 
treat when a need for treatment is indicated32 or for unnecessari-
ly exposing a patient to the inherent risks and harms of treat-
ment.33 In the second instance, lawsuits may derive from the 
negligent execution of treatment itself (as distinct from the deci-
sion to treat).34 In the Appendix, I expand on the analysis from 
Parts II and III to include consideration of such negligent-
execution lawsuits. As demonstrated in the Appendix, that 
broader discussion reinforces the predictions derived below. 
 
 31 This framework is inspired by a similar discussion in my previous work. See Mi-
chael Frakes, Defensive Medicine and Obstetric Practices, 9 J Empirical Legal Stud 457, 
462–63 (2012). This framework likewise builds on the model of physician decisionmaking 
introduced by Professors Janet Currie and Bentley MacLeod, who similarly account for 
the competing risks of failing to treat and of executing the treatment, while acknowledg-
ing that such risks may be a function of the patient’s health status. See Currie and  
MacLeod, 123 Q J Econ at 804–13 (cited in note 24). The analysis in Parts II and III ex-
tends the framework from each of these prior works and generates various additional 
hypotheses while also incorporating considerations of substantive, as opposed to merely 
remedial, liability reforms. 
 32 See, for example, Boone v William W. Backus Hospital, 864 A2d 1, 13–14 (Conn 
2005) (holding that a hospital’s failure to treat a child who had manifested symptoms 
indicating an allergic reaction to antibiotics constituted a medical malpractice claim). 
 33 See, for example, Yoshizaki v Hilo Hospital, 427 P2d 845, 846, 854 (Hawaii 1967) 
(involving a plaintiff who underwent unnecessary radiation treatment after being misdi-
agnosed with cancer and suffered burns as a result). 
 34 See, for example, Arnold v Grigsby, 289 P3d 449, 451–52 (Utah 2012) (involving 
a plaintiff who suffered a perforated colon after an allegedly negligent colonoscopy). 
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A. The Basic Framework of the Model 
Consider a simple decisionmaking setting. Patients seek the 
services of a physician to address an underlying medical condi-
tion. Patients present themselves with varying degrees of health 
and with varying risk factors, s, which one can specify as being 
uniformly distributed over a [0,1] range, with a patient with an s 
score of 0 representing the patient with the fewest complica-
tions, and a patient with an s score of 1 representing the patient 
with the most health complications. Physicians are faced with a 
simple binary choice: offer treatment to resolve the underlying 
medical condition (the costlier option) or suggest no treatment. 
For instance, if this scenario involved the care provided to a pa-
tient with a serious heart disease, treatment might indicate an 
intensive approach such as CABG or angioplasty, whereas no 
treatment would represent a nonintensive medical-management 
approach.35 
Effectively, physicians will decide on a cutoff point, ̂ݏ, along 
the distribution of risk factors, s, at which physicians will elect 
treatment. For some range of complications below this cutoff—
that is, for the subset of the healthiest patients below this cut-
off—the physician might deem treatment unnecessary. For risk-
factor levels above the cutoff point, the physician will elect to 
treat. Considering that risk factors are assumed to be distribut-
ed uniformly over the unit interval, this clinical behavior can be 
summarized by a treatment rate of 1 –	̂ݏ. 
B. Determination of Treatment Rate Based on Clinical 
Assessments of Competing Health Risks 
A range of factors may influence the physician’s desired cut-
off point: actual clinical beliefs, financial-reimbursement moti-
vations, convenience, and others. To begin, however, consider 
only the clinical opinions of physicians regarding the appropri-
ateness of treatment given s. That is, consider their baseline be-
liefs about the right balance of the relevant health risks in play. 
The underlying medical condition carries health risks if it is not 
addressed. These risks increase in severity as the complication 
 
 35 In modeling care as a choice between intensive intervention and nonintensive 
intervention, I am essentially following a common approach in the literature on the eco-
nomics of physician decisionmaking. See, for example, Amitabh Chandra and Douglas O. 
Staiger, Productivity Spillovers in Health Care: Evidence from the Treatment of Heart 
Attacks, 115 J Polit Econ 103, 106 (2007). 
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level of the patient, s, rises. With significant complications, the 
consequences of failing to address the underlying medical condi-
tion are potentially severe. Assume that the imposition of the 
treatment will address and eliminate the underlying medical 
condition and the risks associated with the condition. As such, 
the benefits of treatment can be captured by B(s), which repre-
sents the condition-related risks eliminated through treatment. 
As assumed, and as demonstrated by Figure 1, such benefits  
increase with the complication level, s. 
The more that the physician elects to treat the patient in 
order to avoid these underlying condition-related risks, the more 
that the physician encounters risks of another sort: treatment-
performance risks. After all, in undertaking the treatment, the 
physician may harm the patient.36 Thus, in forming her clinical 
beliefs regarding the appropriateness of treatment for each pa-
tient given the patient’s complication level, a physician will 
weigh these respective risks. That is, she will weigh the underly-
ing health risks of failing to address the medical condition 
against the health risks associated with treatment itself. These 
risks and harms associated with treatment are captured by C.37 
To the extent that the physician is motivated only by a consider-
ation of her perception of these relative risks, she will consider 
patients one by one, starting from the healthiest, and will con-
tinue to avoid treatment as long as the cost of treatment, C, ex-
ceeds the benefit, B. The physician will begin to treat once the 
benefit surpasses the cost. Therefore, an equilibrium will be 
reached whereby the physician sets a cutoff point, ̂ݏ, at which 
the benefit and cost curves intersect, as demonstrated by  
Figure 1. 
 
 36 At a minimum, it is worth emphasizing that treatment is associated with a level 
of expected discomfort. 
 37 I assume that C does not vary with the health status of the patient, s. In other 
words, while the underlying medical treatment may deliver greater benefits to the sicker 
patient in resolving the underlying condition, a healthy patient can be just as harmed by 
the treatment as a sick patient. 
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FIGURE 1.  TREATMENT SELECTION GIVEN THE COSTS AND 
BENEFITS OF TREATMENT 
 
C.  Marginal Impact of Liability: First-Order Considerations 
Now consider how the imposition of a liability threat may 
impact this equilibrium. That is, what role does malpractice law 
play on the margin? It is critical to phrase this inquiry in such 
marginal terms. After all, physician behavior has many deter-
minants. If one were to simply remove the malpractice system or 
blunt its impact through a damage-cap adoption, such other de-
terminants would remain in place. We want to learn what the 
law is doing beyond such other influences. 
To begin to answer this question, assume that the liability 
system is free of uncertainty and error. While I will relax this 
assumption momentarily, it is helpful to begin here in order to 
understand the most immediate forces in place under the struc-
ture of our liability system. To restate this initial assumption, 
the law will consistently set a particular standard of care that 
the physician is expected to follow, and the physician is assumed 
to determine with certainty what this standard is. What exactly 
will that standard be? Consistent with the historical and largely 
self-regulatory approach taken in the United States, assume 
that physicians are held to a negligence standard determined by 
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the customary practices applied by physicians themselves.38 
That is, if a physician follows the care ordinarily and customari-
ly provided by other physicians under similar circumstances, she 
will be deemed to have satisfied the necessary standard and ac-
cordingly not be found negligent.39 In terms of the above model, 
the standard expected under the law will be set at	̂ݏ, the cutoff 
point (with an associated treatment rate of 1 –	̂ݏ) actually im-
plemented by physicians as a result of their nonliability influ-
ences. If the physician fails to treat beyond the customary cutoff 
point—at which physicians otherwise generally elect to treat—
she may subject herself to liability. Similarly, if the physician 
treats at levels of s below this cutoff point—that is, in situations 
in which physicians normally do not treat—she may subject her-
self to liability for unnecessarily exposing the patient to the risk 
of treatment. 
In other words, physicians set their own standards and the 
law simply catches deviations from those physician-determined 
standards.40 In this case, liability only reinforces the preliability 
equilibrium and incentivizes physicians to continue setting their 
practices such that they follow a treatment rate of 1 – ̂ݏ and a 
treatment cutoff of ̂ݏ. Thus, as a first-order matter, liability forc-
es under a custom-based system do not push clinical behaviors in 
any particular direction. Consequently, as a first-order matter, if 
we were to diminish the force of the liability system by adopting 
a reform that softens the consequences of malpractice liability—
for example, a damage cap—one would not expect physician 
practices to deviate from their initial position. 
 
 38 That is, unlike most cases of negligence, medical malpractice cases largely do not 
involve abstract determinations of what a “reasonable prudent person” would do under 
similar circumstances but instead ask what physicians actually do under similar  
circumstances. Blumstein, 59 Vand L Rev at 1023–24, 1030 (cited in note 14). Professor 
Philip Peters has documented a recent trend in some states toward modification of the 
language of standard-of-care instructions in the direction of a “reasonable physician” 
standard. Philip G. Peters, The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at 
the Millennium, 57 Wash & Lee L Rev 163, 164 (2000) (noting that a dozen states have 
expressly rejected the custom-based standard and another nine states have adopted a 
“reasonable physician” standard). But see Alex Stein, Toward a Theory of Medical Mal-
practice, 97 Iowa L Rev 1201, 1202, 1228 (2012) (contending that the legal developments 
that Peters references are limited in degree and focus on hospitals’ “setup” efforts, not 
their treatment efforts, where “setup” refers to the organizing of equipment, personnel, 
or facilities). 
 39 See, for example, Shier v Freedman, 206 NW2d 166, 171 (Wis 1973). 
 40 See Peters, 57 Wash & Lee L Rev at 163 (cited in note 38). 
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D.  Marginal Impact of Liability: Second-Order Considerations 
Of course, the notion of a liability system without any un-
certainty or error is far from realistic. On occasion, a court may 
misperceive the customary norms of practice.41 For instance, 
consider a patient with a complication level below 	̂ݏ, at which 
physicians would typically opt not to treat someone. Given some 
proneness for error, a court evaluating the decision of a physi-
cian not to treat this patient may make the incorrect assessment 
that physicians customarily do perform treatment in such cir-
cumstances and thus attribute negligence to this physician. 
Even though, as an immediate matter, custom-based liability 
standards may not disrupt equilibrium treatment patterns, 
might physicians alter their clinical behaviors in light of the 
possibility of an error at court? 
In answering this question, one must first wonder how phy-
sicians will factor in liability considerations when making 
treatment elections in a situation in which the law does not pro-
vide clear signals. In the face of this legal uncertainty, I effec-
tively assume that physicians will evaluate the legal implica-
tions of their actions by simply considering how the health risks 
facing patients depend on such actions. Consideration of such 
risks provides a sense of the consequences at stake in the rele-
vant treatment decisions—that is, a sense of the expected dam-
ages that could be imposed on physicians should they be found 
to have negligently managed such patients.42 If executing the 
treatment is likely to pose substantial risks to the patient, the 
physician may be wary of undertaking that action in light of the 
possibility that she will be found negligent for doing so and re-
sponsible for compensating the patient for the associated harms. 
To be clear, if the physician could be certain that this action 
would be deemed nonnegligent, she would face few such con-
cerns. On the other hand, if not performing the treatment on a 
particular patient poses a substantial risk of failing to resolve 
the underlying medical condition, the physician may be wary of 
 
 41 See id at 187 (explaining that “even when a widely favored approach actually 
exists, ascertaining that custom at reasonable cost may be impossible” because “expert 
witnesses . . . do not know (and typically could not hope to know) the actual percentage 
of physicians who would act as the defendant did under the specific circumstances posed 
by the patient’s condition”). 
 42 If both patient A and patient B were not treated and claim that they should have 
been treated, but patient A would have benefited substantially more from treatment 
than patient B (given their respective health statuses), then I assume that patient A 
would be able to acquire far more in damages should she prevail than patient B. 
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not electing treatment in light of the possibility that she will be 
found negligent under a failure-to-treat theory and likewise be 
responsible for all the harms associated with the unresolved 
medical condition. Which way the physician goes—treat or not 
treat—may depend on which of these two possibilities she finds 
to be most prevalent for the given patient. 
Conventional wisdom seems to suggest that physicians 
would rather err on the side of overtreating in the face of such 
uncertainty.43 Why? Perhaps because the perceived consequenc-
es of performing an arguably unnecessary treatment are likely 
less severe than the consequences of failing to address the un-
derlying medical condition—that is, failing to employ treat-
ment.44 I first suggest that this perception is arguably illusory. 
As is evident in Figure 1, in the case of those patients who gen-
erally receive treatment, the gap between the benefits of treat-
ment and the costs of treatment—the net benefits that would 
otherwise be at stake in the event that treatment was not per-
formed—are substantial. In fact, those net benefits appear 
greater on average than the gap between the costs of treatment 
and the benefits of treatment—that is, the net consequences at 
stake in the event that treatment were to be performed—for 
those who generally do not receive treatment. In other words, 
the average distance between B and C is greater to the right of 
	̂ݏ than it is to the left of ̂ݏ. This may give the impression that 
the stakes of failing to perform a needed treatment are greater 
than the stakes of performing an unnecessary treatment. The 
important point to note is that this may be true on average; 
however, it is not necessarily true for the marginal patient, 
which is where the emphasis should lie. Again, our task is to ask 
what forces the law is imposing after considering the influence 
of financial and other determinants of physician practices. 
 
 43 See Physicians on Medical Liability Reform Options: An Online Quantitative Re-
search Study *5–7 (Jackson Healthcare, Dec 5, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/KTB8 
-L68K (finding that 75 percent of surveyed physicians practice defensive medicine,  
primarily “to avoid being named in a potential lawsuit”). 
 44 Analysts frequently state that legal uncertainty in the determination of malprac-
tice standards will induce physicians to undertake costlier precautions. See, for example, 
Blumstein, 59 Vand L Rev at 1031 (cited in note 14). While such analysts are rarely ex-
plicit in acknowledging the trade-off in risks between treating and not treating the un-
derlying condition, one might read their conclusions as implicitly assuming greater con-
sequences associated with not treating when the law will erroneously expect a physician 
to treat, relative to the consequences associated with treating when the law will errone-
ously expect a physician not to treat. 
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The above analysis demonstrates that the physician’s non-
legal influences will cause her to select a cutoff at ̂ݏ and thus 
treat at a rate equal to 1 – ̂ݏ. In this range, since the physician 
has already treated those most in need of treatment, the most 
pronounced benefits from treatment have already been exhaust-
ed. By the nature of the triage process, the physician will have 
already brought us to the point at which the benefits and costs 
of treatment on the margin are on par with one another—that is, 
the point at which the net benefits from treatment are perhaps 
negligible. Thus, for such marginal patients, one might not ex-
pect from the outset that failure-to-treat concerns will trump 
improper-execution concerns. The two concerns may be a wash, 
in which event liability forces may again not push practices in 
one direction or the other. 
Nonetheless, to be more rigorous in the demonstration of 
this point, consider more explicitly the possibility of court error 
in this setting. That is, consider a situation in which the court 
may evaluate customary practices by either implicitly overesti-
mating the benefits of treatment, in which case the court’s per-
ceived benefits curve is shifted upward to B′, or implicitly un-
derestimating the benefits of treatment, in which case the 
perceived benefits curve is shifted downward to B″. I assume 
that the magnitude of the error is symmetrical on either side—
that is, courts are just as likely to overestimate as they are to 
underestimate (and by the same amount). How might physicians 
respond to this uncertainty? 
First, let us address the possibility of an overestimation. 
Take a patient with a complication level just below ̂ݏ. The court-
perceived benefits from treating this patient equal the distance 
between B′ and C at that point, as indicated by the distance z in 
Figure 2. If the physician were to continue to set her customary 
cutoff at ̂ݏ and thus not treat this particular patient, the physi-
cian would be found in breach of the standard that the court has 
mistakenly set. The level of damages that she might be expected 
to face in this instance would equal the distance z. Might this 
compel her to decide to treat this patient? Bear in mind that she 
does not know ex ante in which direction the court will err, and 
she will thus balance the likelihood of paying z in damages with 
an evaluation of the possibility that the court will assess the 
customary standard in a way that implicitly underestimates the 
benefits of treatment at B″. That is, she will also consider the 
possibility that the court will mistakenly expect a higher cutoff 
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point and a correspondingly lower treatment rate. At the 
benchmark level of practices represented by the treatment cutoff 
of ̂ݏ, the physician would be treating some patients that the 
court, given its underestimation of treatment benefits, feels 
should not be treated. This may create a countervailing incen-
tive to lower one’s treatment rate. Consider the patient with a 
complication level, s, just to the right of ̂ݏ—a patient who would 
customarily receive treatment. The harms and risks of treat-
ment for this patient exceed the perceived (underestimated) 
benefits of treatment by the vertical segment indicated in Figure 
2, which carries a length of y. Similarly, if the physician were to 
continue to set her customary treatment cutoff at ̂ݏ and thus 
still treat this patient, she would be found in breach of the mis-
takenly set standard. The expected level of damages would be 
captured by this distance, y. 
In the mind of a physician who wishes to maintain her cus-
tomary practices at ̂ݏ and who understands that the court may 
err in setting a standard on either side of ̂ݏ, the question be-
comes: Which set of consequences are greater? That is, how does 
z compare with y? If she stays at ̂ݏ, she faces not only the possi-
bility of damages for having treated the last marginal patient 
when she should not have, but also the possibility of damages 
for not treating the next marginal patient when she should 
have. If z trumps y, then, in expectation, she may sense that the 
potential damages facing her are greater for the latter possibil-
ity, thereby compelling her to treat more on the margin. 
So, how does z compare with y? For the sake of simplicity, I 
do not specify functional forms for the benefits curve, B, that 
might facilitate a more rigorous mathematical comparison of the 
magnitudes of z and y—that is, the potential liability amounts 
for failing to alter behavior in the face of these two different  
errors. Rather, through a visual depiction of such measures, I 
simply aim to demonstrate that the magnitudes of such poten-
tial liability amounts are nearly or essentially identical. 
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FIGURE 2.  TREATMENT SELECTION UNDER UNCERTAINTY 
 
To summarize, when the court errs symmetrically on either 
side of the customary standards actually followed by physicians, 
the potential liability at stake for failing to treat the marginal 
patient when the court mistakenly expects a physician to treat 
is of essentially the same magnitude as the potential liability at 
stake for treating the marginal patient when the court mistak-
enly expects a physician to avoid treatment. As such, this graph-
ical analysis demonstrates that the conventional perception that 
court errors might cause one to overtreat due to the relatively 
greater liability consequences stemming from failure-to-treat 
scenarios than from inappropriate-treatment scenarios is per-
haps unfounded. Rather, considering that these potential conse-
quences are in balance, a physician not knowing ahead of time 
how the court will err will not feel compelled to either increase 
or decrease her treatment rates. 
On the other hand, physicians may be inclined to overtreat 
to the extent that they anticipate an asymmetrical error on the 
part of courts in determining liability standards. That is, if phy-
sicians think that courts will systematically assess customary 
practices in a way that implicitly overestimates the benefit of 
treatments, then physicians will believe that the average poten-
tial liability at stake for failing to treat the marginal patient 
may indeed exceed the average potential liability for improperly 
treating the marginal patient, compelling additional treatments. 
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E.  Determination of Treatment Rate Based on Multiple 
Nonliability Factors 
However, even in instances of asymmetrical error on the 
part of courts, I contend that it is not immediately clear that 
court error will induce physicians to increase their treatment 
rates and thus practice expansionary defensive medicine (as just 
surmised). In illustrating this final contention, I bring myself to 
perhaps the second most important reason (aside from the ob-
servation that liability standards are based on custom) why em-
pirical estimates of defensive medicine may be significantly low-
er than conventional expectations. This reason stems from 
consideration of all the additional factors that likewise compel 
physicians to opt for treatment. The graphical demonstration 
has thus far simply assumed that the only nonliability factor 
driving behavior is the physician’s clinical beliefs regarding the 
various health risks at issue. Now, let us expand this graphical 
analysis to consider a range of additional motivations. 
For instance, consider the role of physician-reimbursement 
structures. Perhaps one of the most recognized features of our 
health-care system that may contribute to excessive health-care 
spending is the “fee-for-service” environment in which most 
health care is administered.45 Under a fee-for-service approach, 
physicians are effectively paid more for doing more, thereby 
providing physicians with a possible incentive to perform an un-
necessarily high degree of services—a phenomenon often labeled 
“physician-induced demand.”46 
Assume that these additional benefits of treatment push the 
physician’s perceived benefit curve, B, upward by an amount 
equal to m.47 I illustrate this upward shift in Figure 3. I label 
this elevated benefits curve as B*. In deciding their cutoff point 
now, using the same thought process set forth above, physicians 
will determine where this new benefit curve, B*, crosses the 
 
 45 David Orentlicher, Cost Containment and the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, 6 FIU L Rev 67, 71 (2011) (“Whether needed or not, a surgical procedure pays 
very well, and there is good reason to think that financial incentives in the U.S. lead 
physicians to perform many unnecessary operations.”). 
 46 Thomas G. McGuire, Physician Agency, in Culver and Newhouse, eds, 1 Hand-
book of Health Economics at 461, 503 (cited in note 7) (defining physician-induced  
demand as a situation in which “the physician influences a patient’s demand for care 
against the physician’s interpretation of the best interest of the patient”). 
 47 While it is possible that these additional influences may also vary in degree by 
patient complication level, I simply assume an increase in physician benefits of the same 
level with respect to patients of all health statuses. 
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cost-of-treatment curve, C. Call this point s*. As is evident from 
Figure 3, this new treatment cutoff is to the left of ̂ݏ, thus repre-
senting a higher treatment rate than was otherwise observed 
when all that the physician took into consideration were her 
clinical beliefs regarding the health risks at issue. 
FIGURE 3.  TREATMENT SELECTION GIVEN ADDITIONAL BENEFITS 
OF TREATMENT TO THE PHYSICIAN 
 
 
What is most important to keep in mind when viewing this 
new equilibrium point is that the marginal patients around this 
new treatment cutoff are quite healthy. With respect to such 
marginal patients, the prevailing health risks suggest a greater 
concern for the harms associated with performing the treatment 
than for the harms associated with the underlying medical con-
dition. After all, the equilibrium reached when the only consid-
erations were the physician’s clinical beliefs was one in which 
the physician decided to keep performing treatments as long as 
the benefits from doing so—that is, the elimination of the health 
risks associated with the underlying medical condition—
outweighed the risks and harms associated with executing the 
treatment itself.48 Thus, on the margin, such risks were in bal-
ance. By increasing treatment rates beyond this starting point 
 
 48 See Part II.B. 
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through the consideration of factors other than clinical beliefs, 
physicians begin treating patients of even healthier dispositions. 
As such, the patients who might not have been treated in the 
previous framework but who are now treated are exposed to 
greater risks and harms from treatment than warranted when 
weighed against the underlying condition-related harms that 
they avoid through treatment. 
Now consider how medical liability impacts this new equi-
librium on the margin. As before, in an immediate sense, the 
deference to customary practices used in determining liability 
standards serves only to reinforce the idea that physicians 
should continue to set their treatment rates at the level com-
pelled by all these nonliability determinants—that is, s*. What 
about secondary considerations stemming from the possibility 
that courts may err in this liability-setting process and thus im-
pose liability standards on either side of s*? To immediately con-
front the more challenging scenario, let us address the situation 
in which the court errs more on the side of implicitly overesti-
mating the benefits of treatment. Might this legal uncertainty 
compel a physician already practicing at the s* cutoff to consider 
treating the marginal patient just to the left of s*—that is, mar-
ginally increasing her treatment-utilization rate in order to 
avoid liability for failing to treat this patient? 
Given the above arguments regarding the relative health 
risks facing this marginal patient, any risk assessment actually 
tips in favor of suggesting that the prevailing concern here is 
with the decision to treat this healthy patient, not with the fail-
ure to treat. As before, if a physician otherwise inclined to stay 
at s* is concerned that the court may not find her decisions 
around this cutoff to comply with custom, she may gauge her po-
tential liability exposure in the case of such patients by refer-
ence to the health risks that they face. To the extent that treat-
ments are not performed, patients may retain their underlying 
medical risks, which may form the basis for suit (based on a 
failure-to-treat theory), exposing the physician to some amount 
of potential damages. To the extent that treatments are per-
formed, patients may be exposed to the risks and harms of 
treatment—which may also possibly form the basis for suit 
(based on an improper-decision-to-treat theory)—also exposing 
the physician to potential damages. Again, whether these possi-
bilities will compel a physician to perform or take away an  
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additional treatment on the margin may depend on how physi-
cians assess the expected levels of damages coming their way. 
The key point here is that this analysis starts from a posi-
tion in which this expected-damages assessment likely entails 
greater concern for an unnecessarily high treatment rate—a 
concern that might compel an uncertain physician to reduce, not 
increase, treatments on the margin. Of course, the operating as-
sumption here is that courts will heavily err on the side of over-
estimating the benefits of treatment. This overestimation re-
stores balance, elevating the expected damages associated with 
failing to treat. However, a court would have to substantially 
overestimate such benefits before a physician might perceive 
there to be, on net, notable consequences at stake for failing to 
treat a given patient, as suggested by Figure 3. At the custom-
ary cutoff between treatment and no treatment, s*, the costs of 
treatment, C, exceed the clinical benefits of treatment, B, by an 
amount equal to m (that is, the net clinical harms of treating 
this patient are at a level commensurate with the nonclinical or 
extraneous gains to the physician from treatment). A court 
would have to misperceive the customary standard of care and 
implicitly overvalue treatment benefits by an amount equal to m 
before these misperceived benefits would even begin to outweigh 
the expected harms associated with treatment. 
The more that a physician succumbs to financial and other 
motivations to increase her treatment rates, the more that 
courts will need to overestimate the benefits of treatment before 
liability forces in the face of such legal uncertainty will really 
compel physicians to increase their treatment rates any  
further.49 
F.  A Summary of Defensive Medicine 
An assessment of what liability means for the average pa-
tient receiving a particular treatment might drive the lay per-
ception of defensive medicine. If one takes the average mother 
receiving a cesarean delivery and considers all her indications 
for surgical treatment—for example, breech presentation, pla-
centa praevia, and so forth—one might conclude that the poten-
tial liability for failing to perform this cesarean delivery is  
 
 49 If anything, liability pressures on the margin, in an environment marked by such 
expansive treatment styles, might compel physicians to perform fewer, not more,  
treatments. 
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substantial. Indeed, with respect to many cesareans that are 
performed, if one asks what would happen if the physician were 
to decide not to perform that cesarean, the answer could very 
well be exposure to substantial liability. However, this thought 
exercise is unhelpful. Why even ask what the liability conse-
quences would be if the physician were not to perform a  
cesarean on this average cesarean mother, considering that the 
physician has so many other motivations to treat her? 
To be fair, it is not clear that commentators and analysts 
contemplating defensive medicine are asking this precise  
question.50 However, in failing to approach the defensive-
medicine discussion in a sufficiently structured manner, it is al-
so unclear exactly what questions these commentators are pro-
posing to answer. Just what subset of patients are they referring 
to in surmising that medical-liability forces may be compelling 
the treatment decision? The above analysis is meant to offer 
helpful guidance in framing this defensive-medicine inquiry and 
in directing analysts’ attention to the more appropriate ques-
tion: On the margin, after considering all the other determi-
nants of physician behavior and in light of the health status of 
the marginal patient, how do medical-liability forces affect the 
treatment decision? 
With this guidance in mind, the above framework potential-
ly explains the empirical findings of only modest defensive med-
icine in the present health-care environment, in addition to  
explaining why the traditional tort reforms embraced to date—
which alter the equilibrium only on the margin and do nothing 
to remove other influences pushing physicians to provide exces-
sive care—may have less of an impact than conventionally ex-
pected.51 At the same time, this framework suggests that these 
findings may be more of a reflection of the context in which such 
studies were undertaken, as opposed to a reflection of the uni-
versal irrelevancy of medical-liability forces in shaping physi-
cian practices. Indeed, one might predict based on this frame-
work that tort reform could lead to a greater reduction in 
treatment intensity (consistent with general perceptions of  
 
 50 See, for example, Frank A. Sloan and John H. Shadle, Is There Empirical Evi-
dence for “Defensive Medicine”? A Reassessment, 28 J Health Econ 481, 481–84 (2009) 
(emphasizing comparisons of marginal costs and marginal benefits when assessing 
claims of defensive medicine). 
 51 See CBO Report at *2–3 (cited in note 3); Sloan and Shadle, 28 J Health Econ at 
490 (cited in note 50). 
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defensive medicine) in certain situations—for example, in the 
case of diagnostic care or in environments marked by weaker re-
imbursement-related motivations, both of which I discuss below. 
G. Stronger Defensive-Medicine Contexts 
1. Diagnostic care. 
In the above discussion, when the possibility of court error 
emerged, the effective stopping force that prevented failure-to-
treat liability fears from pushing treatment rates significantly 
upward was corresponding fears stemming from negligent expo-
sure to treatment risks. If such offsetting fears are absent in 
certain clinical contexts—for example, in certain diagnostic con-
texts—then liability forces may lead to expansionary utilization 
practices on the part of physicians. While this is not always the 
case with diagnostics, one generally encounters more-minor 
health risks in receiving a diagnostic procedure than in receiv-
ing the more-intensive procedures motivating the above model.52 
Of course, even in the case of diagnostics, there may be 
some natural limit to how high diagnostic-utilization rates may 
go—a limit that may not fit into the above framework. This limit 
may result from pressures associated with the financial costs of 
treatment (something not modeled in the above framework for 
purposes of analytical tractability) or from some sentiment 
among physicians that “enough is enough.”53 Driving this latter 
sentiment may be some inclination to maintain at least the ap-
pearance that one’s clinical practice is not subject to motivations 
beyond the best interests of the patient. Procedure-utilization 
rates approaching 100 percent would certainly threaten the de-
tection of a bias in clinical practices. To the extent that financial 
 
 52 The National Cancer Institute, for example, lists the downsides to mammograms 
and states that “[m]ammograms require very small doses of radiation. . . . The benefits of 
mammography, however, nearly always outweigh the potential harm from the radiation 
exposure.” National Cancer Institute, Fact Sheet: Mammograms (National Institutes of 
Health, Mar 25, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/BZ23-BE2U. 
 53 Sherry Glied, Managed Care, in Culyer and Newhouse, eds, 1 Handbook of 
Health Economics, 707, 716 (cited in note 7) (“[M]anaged care plans also directly monitor 
service utilization. They do this by placing limits on which providers an enrollee may see 
and by placing limits on what those providers can do.”). However, the use of utilization 
review to set this upper limit on treatment is controversial and has prompted significant 
backlash—namely, external-review statutes that allow patients to appeal adverse utili-
zation-review decisions to a neutral arbitrator. See Russell Korobkin, The Battle over 
Self-Insured Health Plans, or “One Good Loophole Deserves Another”, 5 Yale J Health 
Pol, L & Ethics 89, 98–99 (2005). 
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motivations already drive diagnostic-utilization rates to this lim-
it, there may again be little left for liability forces to do on the 
margin. 
Ultimately, there may be reason to believe that defensive 
medicine is more widespread in the case of diagnostic care, 
though perhaps only to a degree. 
2. Weakened financial motivations. 
A second context in which medical-liability forces may place 
greater inflationary pressure on health-care spending is when 
reimbursement-related incentives to overtreat are muted. As 
above, it is possible that liability fears will push treatment up-
ward in situations in which courts might err in assessing cus-
tomary standards and in which that error tends on the side of 
implicitly overestimating the benefits from treatment. However, 
as demonstrated above,54 this possibility becomes more remote 
as other motivations to treat patients emerge, including finan-
cial motivations. In our environment of general excess, financial 
factors may be sufficient to push practices to their natural lim-
its, in which case diminishing liability forces through the adop-
tion of damage caps may be inconsequential.55 In another envi-
ronment in which such nonliability motivations are restrained, 
the liability factor may find itself more influential in bringing 
practices up to that limit. In this latter circumstance, reducing 
the liability channel through a damage cap or similar reform 
may lead to a meaningful reduction in treatment rates. 
In other words, if health-care spending can be characterized 
as a four-legged table, with one of the legs constituting liability, 
then removing that leg alone may not cause the table to topple. 
However, if we have already removed the financial-motivation 
leg, then a subsequent removal of the liability leg may indeed 
bring the table down. In this light, medical liability may play a 
role in the health-care–cost-containment debate that is easily 
overlooked by simply relying on the fact that defensive-medicine 
studies to date largely document only a modest (at best) reduc-
tion in health-care utilization in connection with the adoption of 
 
 54 See Part II.E. 
 55 As above, limits to how high treatment rates can go may arise due to the possi-
bility of liability for exposing patients to treatment-performance risks or some inclina-
tion on the part of physicians to avoid detection of bias in their clinical practices. 
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damage caps and related reforms.56 Failing to acknowledge a po-
tentially stronger residual role for liability should other deliv-
ery-system reforms succeed in eliminating financial and other 
motivations to overtreat patients, analysts may overestimate the 
ultimate success that would arise from such nonliability-related 
reforms.57 
A natural way to investigate these dynamics is to observe 
our experience to date with Health Maintenance Organizations 
(HMOs). These organizations—which proliferated heavily dur-
ing the 1990s and have retreated somewhat during the 2000s—
provide health insurance or health care while employing a range 
of techniques to help contain health-care costs.58 While some 
scholars have acknowledged that cost-containment techniques 
such as HMOs may interact with liability forces and thus alter 
the defensive-medicine landscape, these scholars have done so in 
an arguably underdeveloped manner.59 For instance, in perhaps 
the most influential of such studies, Professor Daniel Kessler 
and Dr. Mark McClellan theorize that HMOs and tort reform 
are substitutes, whereby tort reform is less effective in reducing 
health-care spending when HMO penetration is already high.60 
They suggest that physicians may be less able to practice defen-
sive medicine—meaning that damage caps would be less able to 
 
 56 See CBO Report at *2–5 (cited in note 3) (finding that damage caps and related 
reforms would result in a mere 0.2 percent reduction in total national health-care  
expenditures). 
 57 See James J. Mongan, Timothy G. Ferris, and Thomas H. Lee, Options for Slow-
ing the Growth of Health Care Costs, 358 New Eng J Med 1509, 1510–12 (2008) (recom-
mending a package of nonliability-related reforms and dismissing the malpractice sys-
tem as having the “lowest potential for cost saving”). 
 58 For an overview of HMOs, see generally Glied, Managed Care (cited in note 53). 
Much of the cost savings achieved through managed-care structures broadly, and vari-
ants of HMO structures more specifically, come through certain financial forces—for ex-
ample, price concessions by physicians contracting to be part of the HMO network or 
staff or, in some cases, reduced incentives to overtreat patients as a result of a shift to-
ward salaried- or capitated-reimbursement structures. See id at 713–15. However, HMO 
structures also seek to contain costs through utilization review—for example, by requir-
ing preadmission authorization by the HMO for hospitalization, applying guidelines for 
treatments of particular conditions, and so forth. See id at 716–17. 
 59 See generally, for example, Daniel Kessler and Mark McClellan, Malpractice 
Law and Health Care Reform: Optimal Liability Policy in an Era of Managed Care, 84 J 
Pub Econ 175 (2002). 
 60 See id at 177 (“Reductions in liability will have more modest effects on treatment 
intensity as the incentives provided by health insurance become higher-powered. For 
example, both managed care and malpractice reforms may discourage physicians from 
ordering additional diagnostic procedures with high costs relative to their expected  
benefits.”). 
13 FRAKES_ART_INTERNET (DO NOT DELETE) 3/24/2015  9:45 AM 
2015] The Surprising Relevance of Medical Malpractice Law 349 
 
reduce expenditures—when the “higher-powered payment in-
centives” of managed care are strongest.61 While Kessler and 
McClellan do not completely unpack this suggestion, I interpret 
their intuition to mean that physicians may have less room to 
succumb to defensive medicine when HMO prevalence is high 
insofar as the strictures of practicing in an HMO environment—
characterized by sometimes-heavy utilization review—stymie 
clinical discretion on the part of physicians and thus stymie the 
opportunity to practice defensively. The direction of this predic-
tion runs counter to that from the above analysis, in which I 
predicted that liability forces might be more, not less, influential 
on the margin in high-HMO environments—that is, in environ-
ments of reduced financial motivations to provide excessive care. 
I do not dispute the merits of the notion that HMO pres-
sures may leave physician discretion hamstrung in general.62 
However, I do contend that this observation catches only part of 
the entire story. It misses the completely opposing notion that 
damage-cap adoptions in an HMO-heavy environment may more 
substantially bring down spending to the extent that the liabil-
ity leg takes on a greater significance in holding up health-care 
costs once the nonliability-related legs are weakened, as  
theorized above.63 
I do concede that diminishing financial motivations through 
stronger HMO penetration may weaken the means by which 
physicians will be able to practice liability-induced defensive 
medicine due to the utilization-review techniques that were of-
ten employed by HMOs during their heyday (for example, re-
quiring preapproval for hospital stays or procedures).64 Utiliza-
tion review and other HMO features could indeed take away the 
ability of physicians to run wild with treatment recommendations, 
 
 61 Id at 176–77. 
 62 See Glied, Managed Care at 716 (cited in note 53) (“[M]anaged care plans also 
directly monitor service utilization. They do this by placing limits on which providers an 
enrollee may see and by placing limits on what those providers can do.”). 
 63 In other words, Kessler and McClellan view the reforms—be they tort reforms or 
financial reforms—as substitutes for each other. The framework that I suggest, however, 
conceptualizes the underlying forces—that is, the legal and financial motivations to in-
crease treatment—as the substitutes of interest. From this latter perspective, the re-
forms that one may take to reduce such underlying forces will not necessarily result in 
the substitution pattern predicted by Kessler and McClellan. 
 64 See Glied, Managed Care at 717 (cited in note 53) (“Utilization review is particu-
larly common for high cost services, such as hospitalizations and surgical procedures. 
About 80% of insurers in 1990 required that enrollees (or their physicians) obtain pre-
admission insurer authorization for hospitalization.”). 
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especially in the case of those patients clearly not in need of 
treatment. However, there is likely some set of patients with no-
table-but-borderline indications for treatment. With respect to 
at least some of these more marginal cases, it is arguably likely 
that physicians responding to liability fears could nonetheless 
justify their treatment decisions in the face of a utilization-
review process. It is of course an empirical question whether the 
frictions of utilization review will be able to overcome defensive 
motivations in these instances. However, I contend that it is in-
deed possible for defensive medicine to be more pervasive in en-
vironments marked by heavy utilization of other cost-
containment techniques, contrary to the Kessler and McClellan 
model. 
III.  THE MECHANICS BEHIND PHYSICIAN RESPONSIVENESS TO 
STANDARD-OF-CARE REFORMS 
In the theoretical framework set forth above, I began by 
asking what treatment rate physicians would follow after con-
sidering all factors other than those related to medical liability. 
I then considered the influence of adding a liability system on 
the margin. However, the above discussion did not consider im-
posing just any kind of liability structure. It entailed adding a 
very specific kind—that is, a structure in which liability is as-
signed to a physician for causing harm to a patient only when 
the physician failed to comply with customary standards. Hav-
ing considered what this structure would do on the margin to 
physician practices, one can effectively predict what might hap-
pen in reverse as we adopt reforms—for example, damage 
caps—that maintain this structure but reduce the expected con-
sequences of liability itself. 
I now build on this analytical framework in order to ask 
questions of a new variety. I largely move away from considering 
the influence of the present liability structure and instead ask 
how physician behavior may be affected by a change in that 
structure itself. By “structure,” I principally mean the substan-
tive manner in which courts assess physician behavior. When 
the law alters the clinical standards that physicians are ex-
pected to follow, might one expect to observe a corresponding al-
teration of physician practices? 
As the analysis in Part II demonstrates, defensive medicine 
may turn out to be muted in the present environment. This need 
not entail, however, that physicians are inherently indifferent to 
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liability forces. As this Part demonstrates, clinical practices may 
change more meaningfully upon an alteration of medical-
liability standards. Understanding this dichotomy is critical to 
illuminating the broader role that medical liability may still 
hope to play in the health-care-spending debate. To demonstrate 
this possibility, let us return to the framework introduced in 
Part II. 
A. The Basic Framework of the Model 
Consider a situation similar to Figure 3 in which the physi-
cian reaches an equilibrium treatment cutoff at s* (representing 
a treatment rate of 1 − s*). As before, s* is to the left of ̂ݏ—that 
is, assume that physicians follow a treatment cutoff point that is 
to the left of the point at which the clinical benefits of treatment 
intersect with the clinical costs of treatment. Essentially, finan-
cial and other motivations cause physicians to inefficiently treat 
some subset of patients for which the harms of treatment sur-
pass the benefits.65 
Simply assume that whatever liability standard is set by the 
court can be determined with certainty—that is, ignore for now 
the second-order impacts of liability on physician behavior deriv-
ing from perceptions of court error. As will be demonstrated be-
low, unlike the situation in Part II, the liability reforms  
entertained in this Part are predicted to alter the baseline-
equilibrium treatment patterns in an immediate sense and in a 
manner that does not stem from the possibility of court error. 
B. Liability Reform “Pushes” Physician Practices Away from 
Their Desired Practices 
As a frame of reference for this analysis, consider a liability 
system that sets operable standards according to customary 
physician practices. As in Part II, a liability system of this na-
ture simply reinforces physician desires to practice at s*, dis-
couraging any deviations from this preexisting, customary 
norm.66 Now consider a reform to the relevant standard-of-care 
rules. In an attempt to redirect the excessive norms of practice 
and diminish health-care spending, assume that the law re-
treats from its expectation that physicians follow the customary 
 
 65 See Orentlicher, 6 FIU L Rev at 71–72 (cited in note 45) (discussing how finan-
cial rewards may lead physicians to perform extra procedures). 
 66 See Part II.E. 
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treatment cutoff—that is, s*—and instead imposes an expecta-
tion that physicians follow the efficient treatment cutoff. That is, 
assume that the courts will impose a new standard at ̂ݏ and thus 
try to redirect physicians to elect treatment only up until the 
point at which the clinical benefits of treatment equal the clini-
cal costs. Even though physicians otherwise desire to begin 
treating at s*, the law now expects them to wait until ̂ݏ—that is, 
to hold off on treating patients until it is truly clinically indicat-
ed to be efficient given the balance of risks at play. Will physi-
cians comply with these new expectations and lower their 
treatment rates accordingly? 
To preview the below analysis, I demonstrate that the an-
swer to the question may indeed be “yes.” In Part II, I showed 
that physicians wanted to follow a particular practice style, and, 
effectively, that the law wanted the same (that is, liability 
standards remain fixed at custom). Now, begin by assuming that 
physicians otherwise want to practice at s*, while the law now 
wants them to practice at ̂ݏ. I suggest below that these modified 
legal expectations may cause physicians to adjust their practices 
in the direction of ̂ݏ. 
To understand this, begin by considering a physician who 
attempts to maintain her otherwise-desired practice style and 
begins treating patients once their complication levels rise to s*. 
This physician will expose herself immediately to possible liabil-
ity under this modified standard-of-care regime. More specifical-
ly, for those patients with complication levels falling between s* 
and ̂ݏ on the complication distribution, the physician will other-
wise desire to treat, but liability fears may cause her to recon-
sider. Since patients in this range have complication levels 
weaker than that deemed necessary to trigger treatment under 
the new efficient standards of care expected by courts, a court 
may view any unnecessary exposure to the inherent risks of 
treatment or surgery in this range as negligent. In other words, 
since these patients now fall into the range in which the law ex-
pects there to be no treatment, physicians may be subjected to 
liability if they nonetheless continue to treat as they customarily 
desire. It should not be assumed that physicians will immediate-
ly succumb to such altered legal expectations.67 Whether this  
 
 67 See Michael Frakes, The Impact of Medical Liability Standards on Regional Var-
iations in Physician Behavior: Evidence from the Adoption of National-Standard Rules, 
103 Am Econ Rev 257, 259 (2013) (discussing possible explanations for physicians’ re-
sponses to legal changes). 
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liability threat induces physicians to withhold a treatment that 
they otherwise want to perform depends on the consequences of 
liability in those instances and how such consequences stack up 
against the net benefits of treatment that the physicians  
perceive.68 
As before, the physician derives value in treating the pa-
tient from various sources, including, among others, financial 
gains from treatment and the avoidance of the health risks im-
posed on patients by the underlying medical condition.69 Offset-
ting these benefits, the physician attributes to her disutility any 
health risks posed by treatment itself on the patients. Absent li-
ability, with respect to this range of patients, the physician 
would elect to treat, registering more benefits than costs (by as-
sumption). However, at least with respect to some of the pa-
tients in this range, the imposition of liability for negligently ex-
posing the patient to the risks of an unnecessary treatment may 
tip the scale and incline the physician not to treat. If the court 
sets a damage award for this negligent treatment decision at a 
level reflective of the harms deriving from this decision, then the 
physician would, ex ante, expect to pay in damages an amount 
equal to the treatment costs, C, net of the clinical benefits of 
treatment that nonetheless came with resolving the underlying 
medical condition. Adding expected liability costs on top of the 
preexisting cost-benefit calculation will likely cause the total 
treatment-related costs to surpass the benefits of treatment for 
some portion of the patients in this range.70 Moreover, consider-
ing all of the nonpecuniary and nonimmediate costs of liability—
for example, spillover reputational damage and psychological 
costs—it is possible that the true harm to the physician from be-
ing found to have negligently treated patients in the range  
between s* and ̂ݏ is substantial, which only reinforces her modi-
fied decision to avoid treating such patients (despite her initial 
desire to do so). 
All told, there is reason to believe that physicians may in-
deed respond to an alteration of the standard of care when the 
 
 68 See Part II.C. 
 69 See Part II.E. 
 70 Moreover, while a risk-neutral physician may simply compare the expected lia-
bility costs with the expected benefits, a risk-averse physician may place enough disutili-
ty on the possibility of a high damage award materializing, even if the liability is ex-
pected to be relatively low on average, to warrant holding back on treatment. As such, for 
those patients in this range in which the average benefits of treatment still exceed these 
average total costs, risk-averse physicians may still be inclined to avoid treatment. 
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law expects that physicians practice at a lower treatment rate. 
Prevailing practices may not collapse all the way to this lower 
rate (depending on the full perceived costs of liability). However, 
I predict that practices will at least shift toward these new  
expectations. 
This analysis has focused on a situation in which the stand-
ard of care expected under the law was modified so as to expect 
a lower treatment rate. While I omit this broader discussion in 
light of the focus in this Article on reforms that can lower 
health-care spending, it can readily be shown under an analo-
gous thought process that physicians may likewise increase 
their treatment rates in the face of a liability reform that in-
stead expects them to clinically follow a more intensive practice 
style. 
C. Liability Reform “Pulls” Physician Practices toward Desired 
Practices 
The preceding analysis assumed that physicians want to 
maintain their customary practices at s*. Now let us make a dif-
ferent assumption. As before, start at the point at which cus-
tomary practices are characterized by a cutoff of s*. (Physicians 
may be following this elevated treatment rate as a result of a 
number of nonlegal motivations—for example, fee-for-service re-
imbursement incentives.) Moreover, begin by considering a lia-
bility system in which standards of care are based on customary 
practices, serving to reinforce the ability of physicians to follow 
these desired practices. Now, however, assume that something 
changes. Whether as a result of some reimbursement-related re-
form or a shift in physician culture, assume that physicians now 
otherwise desire to follow the efficient treatment rate and not 
begin treating patients until their complication levels rise to ̂ݏ. 
Under a standard of care set according to custom, physi-
cians will face liability resistance in attempting to lower their 
treatment rates from 1 − s* to the now-desired 1 – ̂ݏ. Again, con-
sider those patients in the range between ̂ݏ and s*. The law ex-
pects that such patients will be treated, thus exposing physi-
cians to liability if they fail to treat those patients. With high 
enough consequences associated with liability (as above), physi-
cians may be deterred from lowering their treatment rates as 
desired. In other words, not only may a custom-based approach 
to setting liability standards insulate physicians desiring to 
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maintain custom, it may also impose friction on any attempts to 
deviate from custom, keeping treatment rates elevated. 
Next, consider how physicians will respond to a liability re-
form that retreats from setting standards according to custom 
and that simply sets a new standard whereby treatment is to be 
indicated once patient complication levels rise to ̂ݏ, but not be-
fore. Essentially, this reform lifts the friction that the custom-
based standard had previously been imposing. Now, liability is 
no longer an obstacle for physicians desiring to lower their 
treatment rates to 1 – ̂ݏ. 
D. Malpractice-Standard Reforms: Summary and Concluding 
Remarks 
 When the law directly changes the clinical standards that it 
expects physicians to follow, one may observe physician practic-
es heading in the direction of the new expectations. Depending 
on the circumstances, this responsiveness may arise either from 
a fear that physicians would expose themselves to liability for 
trying to maintain their old practices or from a relaxation of a 
constraint that the previous legal standard had imposed on phy-
sicians otherwise inclined to alter their practices on their own. 
The larger the gap between the previous clinical expectations 
and the modified clinical expectations, the larger effect that one 
might expect to observe from the modified legal standard. 
It is critical to note that the mechanism behind these physi-
cian reactions to liability does not arise from some higher fre-
quency of malpractice lawsuits.71 After all, consider the extreme 
case of a perfectly functioning liability system. Physicians have 
a clear understanding of what is expected of them. They conform 
their behavior appropriately. The shadow of liability may dis-
courage them from deviating, in which event they may never de-
viate and few or no lawsuits follow.72 If the standards of care 
clinically expected of physicians under the law are subsequently 
altered, one may immediately see physicians adjust to the new 
standard precisely because they avoid the shadow of liability. All 
 
 71 See Alan G. Williams, The Cure for What Ails: A Realistic Remedy for the Medi-
cal Malpractice “Crisis”, 23 Stan L & Pol Rev 477, 486 (2012). 
 72 It is worth noting that the shadow of liability does not just keep physicians in 
line; it is also powerful enough to stimulate beneficial reforms. See, for example, Michael 
Rustad and Thomas Koenig, Reconceptualizing Punitive Damages in Medical  
Malpractice: Targeting Amoral Corporations, Not “Moral Monsters”, 47 Rutgers L Rev 
975, 1019 (1995). 
13 FRAKES_ART_INTERNET (DO NOT DELETE) 3/24/2015  9:45 AM 
356  The University of Chicago Law Review [82:317 
   
this may transpire without any lawsuit being filed, as long as 
such a threat remains viable. Naturally, no such perfection ex-
ists in our liability system or in our grasp of its clinical expecta-
tions. Nonetheless, this simple model provides a useful depiction 
of the underlying forces in play.73 
In Part II, any responsiveness in physician practices to fears 
over medical liability stemmed from the possibility of court  
error.74 In the present analysis, behavioral responses emerge 
from a shift in standards themselves without any need for such 
court error. While I omit a discussion that incorporates such 
noise into this framework, it can readily be shown that consid-
erations of court error largely do not alter the conclusions of this 
malpractice-standard-reform analysis. In short, if the standard 
of care shifts from expecting that physicians select a treatment 
cutoff of s* to a treatment cutoff of ̂ݏ, then noise around this new 
expectation—that is, ̂ݏ—may not substantially change the fact 
that expectations are being altered in the direction of ̂ݏ (as long 
as the noise is modest relative to the gap between the old and 
the new expectations of the courts).75 
In essence, the analysis presented in Parts II and III pro-
vided a framework by which to understand how medical-liability 
forces affect physician behavior across a range of situations, pre-
senting a depiction of context-dependent forces that are often 
overlooked in superficial analyses of medical malpractice. Im-
portantly, this framework allows us to reconcile much of the ex-
isting empirical literature, suggesting: (1) how the equilibrium 
reached in the current liability system may not be one that plac-
es significant expansionary pressures on costs and thus how di-
minishments in the severity of this system through the adoption 
of damage caps may not generate substantial cost savings; and 
 
 73 In the extreme, of course, a noisy liability system could undermine the ability of 
standard-of-care reforms to achieve this effect. After all, if liability were perceived as a 
completely random process, then any deterrent signal that it hopes to send would be 
powerless. Evidence, however, does suggest some degree of targeting efficiency. See 
Studdert, et al, 354 New Eng J Med at 2028 (cited in note 20) (determining that 73 per-
cent of claims in a sample “had outcomes concordant with their merit”). 
 74 See Part II.D. 
 75 If physicians are concerned that courts will assess the new standard at a point at 
which it deviates by an even greater amount from s*, then physicians may be even more 
inclined to reduce their treatment rates accordingly. On the other hand, if courts err on 
the side of assessing the new standard at a point that is not quite far enough away from 
s* as they would like to actually ensure the efficient outcome, physicians may still be 
inclined to lower their treatment rates in the direction of 1 − ̂ݏ as long as the courts’  
incorrectly determined standard remains between the old and new standards. 
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(2) at the same time, how more-substantive reforms affecting 
the core of the negligence determination—that is, the standards 
expected of physicians—may lead to more-substantial responses. 
I now turn to a general discussion of the various forms of empir-
ical support in the literature for the predictions of this model. 
IV.  SUPPORTIVE EVIDENCE 
The analysis set forth in Parts II and III carries a number of 
predictions. In this Part, I discuss a range of evidence presented 
in both published and working papers in the empirical medical-
malpractice literature that supports this theoretical framework. 
I also introduce novel empirical evidence bearing on one critical 
prediction of the above model. 
A. Limited Impacts of Noneconomic-Damage Caps and Related 
Remedy-Centric Reforms 
Perhaps the most important takeaway of Part II is that 
medical-liability fears in the present environment are unlikely, 
on the margin, to contribute substantially to health-care spend-
ing due to the system’s adherence to custom-based standards of 
care and to the presence of additional motivations to provide ex-
cessive care. Several high-profile meta-analyses and other eval-
uations conducted over the last decade lend support to this 
claim, challenging the conventional perception that defensive 
medicine is a substantial driver of health-care spending. For in-
stance, in 2009, the CBO predicted that the national implemen-
tation of a package of tort reforms (including caps) designed to 
reduce malpractice pressure and lower the probability of a mal-
practice suit would lead to only a shockingly low 0.3 percent re-
duction in the utilization of health-care services.76 Again, the 
 
 76 CBO Report at *1–2 (cited in note 3). Despite the minor effects predicted by the 
CBO, its analysis does draw on some studies that have found a more sizeable response to 
malpractice forces. See, for example, Daniel Kessler and Mark McClellan, Do Doctors 
Practice Defensive Medicine?, 111 Q J Econ 353, 378–79 (1996) (estimating that tort re-
forms that directly reduce liability pressure in turn reduce medical expenditures associ-
ated with the care provided in the one-year period following an acute myocardial infarc-
tion or new ischemic heart disease by 5 to 9 percent); Darius N. Lakdawalla and Seth A. 
Seabury, The Welfare Effects of Malpractice Liability, 32 Intl Rev L & Econ 356, 365 
(2012) (identifying the impacts of malpractice law using variations in the generosity of 
local juries and finding that the growth in malpractice payments over the last decade 
and a half has contributed to at most a 5 percent increase in the growth of medical ex-
penditures); Ronen Avraham, Leemore S. Dafny, and Max M. Schanzenbach, The Impact 
of Tort Reform on Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance Premiums, 28 J L, Econ & Org 
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implication of limited impacts of liability-reducing reforms of 
this nature is that defensive inclinations to overtreat patients 
are likely not substantial on the margin prior to such reforms.77 
Professors Frank Sloan and John Shadle used longitudinal data 
from the National Long-Term Care Survey merged with Medi-
care-claims data and found no evidence to suggest that tort re-
forms that directly diminished malpractice pressure (including 
caps) reduced Medicare spending across a range of medical  
scenarios.78 
With slightly larger estimates, Professor Michelle Mello and 
coauthors, in an influential Health Affairs article published in 
2010, estimated that defensive medicine likely cost the United 
States about $45.6 billion in 2008, or roughly 2 percent of overall 
health-care spending, likewise largely drawing on studies that 
have explored the impacts of damage caps and related reforms.79 
 
657, 672 (2010) (estimating that certain tort-reform adoptions between 1998 and 2006 
are associated with a 2.1 percent reduction in premiums of employer-sponsored–self-
insured health plans). The CBO Report also draws on other studies suggesting more lim-
ited responses. See, for example, Katherine Baicker, Elliott S. Fisher, and Amitabh 
Chandra, Malpractice Liability Costs and the Practice of Medicine in the Medicare Pro-
gram, 26 Health Affairs 841, 850 (2007) (estimating that the 60 percent increase in mal-
practice premiums between 2000 and 2003 was associated with an increase in Medicare 
spending of more than $15 billion). Assuming a roughly $2.6 trillion annual health-care 
spending level, the Baicker study represents an increase in spending of less than 0.6 
percent of aggregate spending. See Health Care Costs: A Primer; Key Information on 
Health Care Costs and Their Impact *1 (Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, 2012), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/JY84-DYB2. The CBO Report also draws on Professors Currie 
and Macleod’s study, which actually estimates that noneconomic-damage caps are  
associated with an increase in cesarean rates, as opposed to the conventionally expected 
decrease. See Currie and MacLeod, 123 Q J Econ at 819–21 (cited in note 24). 
 77 Of course, the validity of adopting damage caps as a mechanism to study the 
more general link between malpractice pressure and physician behavior rests on an as-
sumption that such reforms do reduce liability pressure. That topic has been the subject 
of much research. See Paik, Black, and Hyman, 10 J Empirical Legal Stud at 641–43 
(cited in note 30). This research indeed documents a reduction in malpractice-claim fre-
quency and severity in connection with adopting noneconomic-damage caps. See id at 
647–50 (finding a 16.5 percent drop in payouts per large paid claim and a 27 to 36 per-
cent drop in large paid claims in connection with adopting damage caps). 
 78 See Frank A. Sloan and John H. Shadle, Is There Empirical Evidence for “Defen-
sive Medicine”? A Reassessment, 28 J Health Econ 481, 486 (2009) (finding a 3.6 percent 
reduction in total payments, which was too small, given the large error, to be  
significant). 
 79 Mello and her coauthors relied heavily on Kessler and McClellan, whose findings 
generally fall on the very high end of those studies that have found a positive association 
between liability forces and health-care costs. See note 76. See also Mello, et al, 29 
Health Affairs at 1573–74 (cited in note 26). It is important to note that follow-up work 
by Kessler and McClellan that incorporated controls for HMO-penetration rates generat-
ed lower estimates than their previous efforts. See Kessler and McClellan, 84 J Pub Econ 
at 189 (cited in note 59) (finding that noneconomic-damage caps were associated with a 
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In another Health Affairs article from the same issue, Professor 
J. William Thomas and coauthors estimated that a 10 percent 
decline in malpractice insurance premiums (which they per-
ceived as a “signal” for the reduced likelihood of tort conse-
quences) is associated with a meager 0.13 percent decline in  
total medical-care spending across a range of 35 specialties (and 
with a decline of less than 1 percent for any given specialty).80 
Finally, in another often-cited report surveying the evidence to 
date on the impacts of various tort reforms (again, including 
damage caps) on physician practices, the Office of Technology 
Assessment in 1994 concluded that such effects are “largely un-
known and are likely to be small.”81 
The estimates from the Health Affairs articles and the CBO 
report represent a significant amount of money.82 However, with 
perhaps more than 30 percent of health-care spending being un-
necessarily wasteful in nature,83 even the larger of these esti-
mates suggests that medical liability may not be among the 
most substantial of health-care-cost drivers.84 At the very least, 
those estimates on the higher end still fall far short of the  
 
roughly 4.2 percent decrease in spending for acute-myocardial-infarction patients and a 
4.4 percent decrease in spending for ischemic-heart-disease patients, contrasted with 5.8 
and 8.9 percent, respectively, from their initial study). It is also important to note that 
the Kessler and McClellan study was focused only on heart patients. The Sloan and 
Shadle analysis casts doubt on the extension of Kessler and McClellan’s results more 
broadly. See Sloan and Shadle, 28 J Health Econ at 486 (cited in note 78) (finding that 
the reduction in health-care costs for any hospitalization as a result of direct reforms 
was not statistically significant, but that the reduction for acute myocardial infarction 
was “nearly statistically significant”). 
 80 J. William Thomas, Erika C. Ziller, and Deborah A. Thayer, Low Costs of Defen-
sive Medicine, Small Savings from Tort Reform, 29 Health Affairs 1578, 1582–83 (2010) 
(“Even if medical malpractice premiums were to be reduced as much as 30 percent, de-
fensive medicine costs would decline no more than 0.4 percent.”). 
 81 Office of Technology Assessment, Defensive Medicine and Medical Malpractice 2 
(US Congress 1994) (“OTA Report”). 
 82 These relatively small percentages constitute a substantial amount of money 
given that the United States spent an estimated $2.6 trillion on health care in 2010. 
Health Care Costs at *1 (cited in note 76). 
 83 See Jonathan Skinner and Elliott S. Fisher, Reflections on Geographic Variations 
in U.S. Health Care *iii (Dartmouth Institute for Health Policy & Clinical Practice, Mar 
31, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/8CZK-MV2B: 
[Our] approach was to ask how much might be saved if all regions could safely 
reduce care to the level observed in low spending regions with equal quality; 
we find estimates ranging from 20–30 percent, but view these as an underes-
timate given the potential savings even in low cost regions. 
 84 See Thomas, Ziller, and Thayer, 29 Health Affairs at 1583 (cited in note 80) 
(“[D]efensive medicine practices exist and are widespread, but their impact on medical 
care costs is small.”). 
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figures sometimes touted by commentators and politicians, some 
of whom have claimed recently that defensive medicine may 
contribute as much as 26 percent to our nation’s health-care 
spending.85 The bulk of the evidence simply does not support 
such exaggerated claims. Consequently, some commentators 
have concluded that defensive medicine is “largely a myth.”86 
The analyses undertaken by these studies are especially 
ambitious in their attempts to estimate the total costs of defen-
sive medicine across the entire system.87 The typical defensive-
medicine study attempts to tackle this endeavor by focusing on 
one clinical context at a time—for example, do medical-liability 
fears lead physicians to perform more cesarean deliveries?88 
While there is naturally some variation across such studies, they 
 
 85 See, for example, Republican Study Committee, Press Release of Chairman Tom 
Price (cited in note 1) (“[P]hysicians estimated that 21 percent of everything they do can 
be attributed to the practice of defensive medicine.”). Representative Price’s comments 
were made in reaction to a survey of physicians commissioned by Jackson Healthcare 
and performed by Gallup. See generally A Costly Defense: Physicians Sound Off on the 
High Price of Defensive Medicine in the U.S. (Jackson Healthcare, 2011), archived at 
http://perma.cc/CW5P-GK3E. The results of the survey suggest that physicians attribute 
an average of 26 to 34 percent of overall costs to defensive medicine. Id at *4. The results 
of this survey are perhaps consistent with others that have likewise asked physicians 
directly whether they practice defensively. For instance, Professor Studdert and col-
leagues surveyed 824 physicians, nearly 93 percent of whom reported practicing defen-
sive medicine. David M. Studdert, et al, Defensive Medicine among High-Risk Specialist 
Physicians in a Volatile Malpractice Environment, 293 JAMA 2609, 2610, 2612 (2005). 
Surveys of this nature, however, suffer from a number of methodological limitations. See 
Sidney Shapiro, et al, The Truth about Torts: Defensive Medicine and the Unsupported 
Case for Medical Malpractice ‘Reform’ *3 (Center for Progressive Reform, Feb 2012), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/5GVM-6SKR (“[P]hysician surveys on the topic suffer from 
dismally low response rates, exploit physicians’ availability bias, offer prompting ques-
tions, [and] employ extremely broad questions.”). In my view, perhaps the most problem-
atic aspect of such survey methodologies is the possibility that physicians themselves 
may fall prey to the average-patient/marginal-patient fallacy discussed above. In think-
ing about the average patient on which physicians perform a particular surgery, they 
may tell themselves that the legal consequences for failing to treat that patient would be 
substantial, in which event medical-liability concerns must have contributed to that de-
cision to treat. However, this may be a poor assessment of the right counterfactual. Had 
liability not been a factor, the physician may have been likely to treat for other reasons. 
Turning to observational data on physician practices can alleviate these concerns and 
facilitate a more appropriate marginal analysis. 
 86 Shapiro, et al, The Truth About Torts at *3 (cited in note 85). 
 87 See, for example, A Costly Defense at *4 (cited in note 85) (“Physicians estimate 
the cost of defensive medicine to be in the $650–$850 billion range.”); Mello, et al, 29 
Health Affairs at 1574 (cited in note 26) (“[W]e arrived at an overall estimate of $45.6 
billion in defensive medicine costs for 2008.”). 
 88 See Avraham, Dafny, and Schanzenbach, 28 J L, Econ & Org at 660 (cited in 
note 76) (“Most empirical work on provider responses to tort reform focuses on a specific 
condition, namely heart disease or pregnancy.”). 
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likewise tell a story in which malpractice forces on the margin 
(in the present environment or system) exert only a modest, if 
any, amount of expansionary pressure on treatments.89 
However, another major takeaway from the above model is 
that these limited average effects of damage-cap adoptions are 
not evidence of a general disregard by physicians of medical-
liability considerations. Physicians may indeed consider liability 
when conducting their practices. The net effects are often a 
wash, as the above discussion demonstrates. On other occasions, 
however, physician sensitivity to liability is predicted to be 
greater. I now turn to discussing those instances. Evidence of 
such nuanced sensitivity lends only further rejection to the no-
tion that liability forces are universally irrelevant to the health-
care-spending debate. 
 
 89 The cesarean-delivery question, in particular, has been the subject of much 
study. Certain early studies found a positive association between malpractice pressure 
and cesarean utilization, consistent with conventional expectations. See, for example, 
Lisa Dubay, Robert Kaestner, and Timothy Waidmann, The Impact of Malpractice Fears 
on Cesarean Section Rates, 18 J Health Econ 491, 501–02, 509 (1999) (estimating a posi-
tive association between cesarean utilization and malpractice insurance premiums using 
1990–1992 birth certificate data). Other studies, however, found no substantial evidence 
of a relationship between cesarean-utilization rates and fluctuations in medical-liability 
pressure on the margin (in the present system). See, for example, Frakes, 9 J Empirical 
Legal Stud at 477 (cited in note 31) (finding no statistically significant relationship be-
tween adopting damage caps and cesarean-utilization rates, with the outer bound of the 
confidence interval of the estimates suggesting at most a 1.2 percent reduction in pre-
vailing cesarean rates); Laura-Mae Baldwin, et al, Defensive Medicine and Obstetrics, 
274 JAMA 1606, 1609 (1995) (finding no association between cesarean utilization and 
physicians’ claims exposure, as measured by both individual physician-claims experience 
and the prevailing practice environment—that is, county claims per physician). Similar 
to the methodology used in the Baldwin study, Professors David Dranove and Yasutora 
Watanabe looked at cesarean-utilization patterns after individual experiences with ce-
sarean-related malpractice suits, found a small but short-lived effect of past liability ex-
posure in inducing more cesarean utilization—suggesting that the initial effect was like-
ly an overreaction—and thereby concluded that recent increases in cesarean utilization 
were likely not in direct response to litigation. See David Dranove and Yasutora 
Watanabe, Influence and Deterrence: How Obstetricians Respond to Litigation against 
Themselves and Their Colleagues, 12 Am L & Econ Rev 69, 92 (2010). One study even 
suggested that malpractice forces may be inducing fewer cesareans on the margin, in 
which case adopting a noneconomic-damage cap induces an increase in cesarean rates. 
See Currie and MacLeod, 123 Q J Econ at 819–21 (cited in note 24) (finding that adopt-
ing noneconomic-damage caps is associated with a roughly 5 percent increase in  
cesarean rates). 
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B. Arguably Greater Impacts of Noneconomic-Damage Caps in 
the Case of Diagnostic Care 
One of the predictions set forth in Part II is that defensive 
medicine, if it exists at all in the present environment, is per-
haps more likely to emerge in the case of diagnostic care.90 
Overall, the defensive-medicine literature appears to support 
this prediction. While the Office of Technology Assessment stat-
ed in its influential 1994 report that the effects of traditional 
tort reforms such as damage caps are “largely unknown and are 
likely to be small,”91 the report was more definitive in suggesting 
that defensive medicine is likely to emerge in the case of diag-
nostic procedures.92 Similarly, Professors Katherine Baicker, El-
liott Fisher, and Amitabh Chandra estimate that the association 
between malpractice awards and premiums and Medicare 
spending is nearly twice as strong in the case of imaging ser-
vices relative to other Medicare services.93 
C. Stronger Impacts of Damage Caps in Jurisdictions Carrying 
High HMO-Penetration Rates 
An important implication of the analysis introduced in Part 
II is that malpractice pressure on the margin may not place very 
much expansionary pressure on health-care costs and utilization 
when financial motivations to provide excessive care are sub-
stantial.94 However, when such other motivations are more mut-
ed, malpractice may be given the opportunity to do more work 
on the margin to encourage additional care. In this Section, I in-
troduce evidence in support of this contention. 
1. Data. 
Before describing the methodology by which I explore 
whether medical liability’s influence on health-care spending is 
indeed stronger during periods of weakened financial incentives 
to treat excessively, let me first briefly describe the data utilized 
in this analysis. First, a key element of data needed for this  
 
 90 See Part II.G.1. 
 91 OTA Report at 2 (cited in note 81). 
 92 See id at 1 (“Overall, a small percentage of diagnostic procedures—certainly less 
than 8 percent—is likely to be caused primarily by conscious concern about malpractice 
liability.”). 
 93 See Baicker, Fisher, and Chandra, 26 Health Affairs at 846–47 (cited in note 76). 
 94 See Part II.E. 
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empirical exercise, as discussed below, is information on the 
HMO-penetration rate of each state in each year, reflecting the 
percentage of the population enrolled in an HMO. I obtained da-
ta of this nature ranging from 1980 to the present using infor-
mation provided to me by HealthLeaders-InterStudy publica-
tions.95 The second major dimension of the requisite data bears 
on health-care spending across regions and over time. While da-
ta on total health-care spending by region were generally  
unavailable over the time period required to implement the  
empirical methodology set forth below, comprehensive Medicare-
spending data were indeed available over such time. For each of 
roughly three hundred “hospital referral regions”96 and for each 
year between 1980 and 2006, I formed measures equal to the to-
tal Medicare Parts A and B97 spending rate per Medicare benefi-
ciary.98 These measures were derived from a previously unavail-
able dataset generously provided to me by the Dartmouth 
Institute for Health Policy and Clinical Practice. 
This dataset presents several advantages. For instance, by 
focusing on an environment in which everyone has the same in-
surance—that is, Medicare—these data ease concerns over noise 
or bias resulting from fluctuations in sources of coverage or fi-
nancing. Perhaps the most important virtue of this dataset, 
however, comes in its breadth of geographical scope and timing. 
By providing aggregate spending measures across all states and 
covering a nearly thirty-year period, this information allows me 
to execute a rich natural-experiment design that draws on the 
experiences of roughly twenty-five state adoptions of noneco-
nomic-damage-cap reforms.99 By contrast, one of the preeminent 
 
 95 See About Us: Vital Managed Care Insights and Analytics for Experts from  
Experts (HealthLeaders-InterStudy), archived at http://perma.cc/PY55-NZ2J (“We . . . 
provide data, directories and analyses of the ever-evolving managed care industry.”). 
 96 Such regions are meant to represent natural delineations of local health-care 
markets centered around a local community or referral hospital. See John E. Wennberg 
and Philip G. Peters Jr, Unwarranted Variations in the Quality of Health Care: Can the 
Law Help Medicine Provide a Remedy/Remedies?, 37 Wake Forest L Rev 925, 926 (2002) 
(explaining that “[t]he populations residing within these regions receive almost all of 
their care from providers located within the region”). 
 97 Medicare Part A provides coverage to Medicare beneficiaries for costs associated 
with hospital care, while Medicare Part B provides supplemental coverage for outpatient 
physician services and certain other services not covered under Medicare Part A. See 
Hospital Insurance Benefits for Aged and Disabled, 42 USC § 1395(c)–(i-5), (j)–(w-5) 
(2011). 
 98 Spending rates were adjusted for underlying differences in the age, race, and sex 
distributions across each region. 
 99 For a description of this natural-experiment methodology, see Part IV.C.2. 
13 FRAKES_ART_INTERNET (DO NOT DELETE) 3/24/2015  9:45 AM 
364  The University of Chicago Law Review [82:317 
   
studies discussed in Part IV.A, for example, draws on infor-
mation from only four state adoptions of noneconomic-damage 
caps.100 As I have discussed in my prior research, the more policy 
experimentation that one can draw on in empirical designs of 
this nature, the more confident one may be that the estimated 
findings can be interpreted in causal terms—that is, that liabil-
ity reforms cause reductions in spending, rather than simply be-
ing correlated with lower spending.101 
2. Empirical methodology. 
Underlying this empirical exercise are two preliminary 
steps: (1) identifying fluctuations in liability pressure in order to 
evaluate the influence of the liability system on the margin and 
(2) identifying environments marked by strong financial incen-
tives to treat patients and those marked by weak incentives to 
practice intensively. Let me discuss each of these in turn. 
Ideally, in order to establish that medical liability causes a 
change in health-care treatment patterns (rather than merely 
being correlated with such treatments), one would compare 
practices in the present liability structure with how such prac-
tices would have evolved in an otherwise-identical environment 
but for the presence of the liability forces under investigation. 
Clearly, this ideal comparison is impossible, given the infeasibil-
ity of creating otherwise-identical environments of this nature. 
Put simply, one cannot turn back time and remove the liability 
system in order to observe how things would have differed. 
Nonetheless, consistent with the empirical malpractice litera-
ture to date, I attempted to create as convincing a counterfactu-
al environment as possible by observing experiences to date with 
the adoption of caps on noneconomic-damage awards.102 
The initial premise behind this approach is that the period 
of time subsequent to a damage-cap adoption can be used to cap-
ture an environment that is otherwise similar to a regular envi-
ronment but for the fact that it faces a weakened liability re-
gime. If health-care spending decreases in response to this 
reduction in pressure, one may infer that spending is generally 
 
 100 See Currie and MacLeod, 123 Q J Econ at 802 (cited in note 24). 
 101 See Frakes, 9 J Empirical Legal Stud at 462 (cited in note 31) (“With a greater 
number of treatment states, it is more likely that spurious state-year shocks that are 
uncorrelated with damage cap laws will average each other out, leaving consistent esti-
mates of the effect of such reforms.”). 
 102 See Part IV.A. 
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elevated due to liability forces. Critical to note, however, is that 
I do not confine the analysis to simply observing the change in 
practices in a given jurisdiction upon the implementation of a 
damage cap. A simple before-and-after calculation of this nature 
would be highly problematic. After all, health-care treatment 
patterns are likely to be changing over time for a multitude of 
reasons, making it difficult to disentangle the effects of the 
damage-cap reform from the effects of all those other determi-
nants of health-care practices. 
As such, in order to form a more convincing counterfactual 
environment with which to explore the effects of damage-cap 
adoptions, I also constructed a comparison group along a sepa-
rate dimension. That is, I attempted to capture a comparison 
group that might be subject to all those forces that shape treat-
ment patterns other than the influence of the damage-cap adop-
tion. By observing the experiences of this latter comparison 
group over time—that is, a group that did not experience any 
change in its liability environment—we may be able to deter-
mine how health-care spending would have trended over time as 
a result of changes in these nonliability-related factors that 
likewise drive health-care spending. In other words, if one is 
concerned that simply looking at health-care spending before 
and after a damage-cap adoption will be confounded by other 
developments, one can attempt to estimate such developments 
by looking at the experiences of a similar environment that did 
not implement a cap at that time. Having done so, one may then 
be in a better position to isolate the true effect of the liability re-
gime on health-care spending. Naturally, in order to identify a 
comparison group of this nature, I looked to those states that did 
not adopt a damage cap around the period of time under  
investigation. 
Let me restate this strategy in terms of the mathematical 
steps needed to achieve this isolation. With respect to those 
states that have adopted caps, I calculated the difference in 
health-care spending before and after the cap adoption. I then 
repeated the same calculation for those nonadopting states over 
the same time period. Finally, I took the difference between 
these two separate estimates. This “difference-in-difference” cal-
culation should allow us to net out the effect of unobservable 
drivers of health-care spending and target our inquiry on the  
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influence of interest: liability.103 By drawing on the staggered 
adoption of damage caps over time by twenty-five states, the ex-
act empirical strategy implemented is far richer than this sim-
ple description; however, this discussion provides the essence of 
the design. 
The strategy discussed thus far provides a mechanism to 
study the impacts of adopting a damage cap, which in turn al-
lows one to explore the marginal influence of the law on  
health-care spending. The story does not end there, however. As 
hypothesized above, the goal is to determine whether this influ-
ence is stronger during times marked by weakened financial in-
centives to practice intensively. To identify a region’s prevailing 
financial incentives, I looked to the degree of HMO penetration. 
As suggested in Part II, greater HMO penetration suggests di-
minished financial motivations to administer additional care.104 
With this mechanism of identifying a region’s financial mo-
tivations to treat, the basic strategy is to explore whether the 
main difference-in-difference calculation described above inten-
sifies as the prevailing HMO-penetration rate increases. The 
Appendix provides more technical details regarding the regres-
sion specification underlying this methodology. In short, this 
approach entails estimating a regression specification (with each 
observation being a given region-by-year group), in which a var-
iable capturing the incidence of a damage cap interacts with an-
other variable capturing the degree of HMO penetration associ-
ated with the given region and year. If we hypothesize that 
health-care spending will fall with the imposition of a cap on 
noneconomic damages, and we in turn hypothesize that this ef-
fect will be stronger when HMO penetration is higher (when  
financial incentives are weaker), then we would expect to esti-
mate a negative coefficient for this interaction term. 
3. Results. 
Table 1 presents the results of this empirical exercise. As 
predicted, the results show a negative coefficient for the interac-
tion between the incidence of a damage-cap provision and the 
prevailing HMO-penetration rate for the given region-by-year 
 
 103 For an overview of difference-in-difference estimation, see Joshua D. Angrist and 
Jörn-Steffen Pischke, Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist’s Companion 227–31 
(Princeton 2009). 
 104 For a discussion of HMOs and the impact of HMO penetration within regions on 
prevailing financial incentives, see Part II.G.2. 
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group. More specifically, the pattern of results presented in Ta-
ble 1 suggests that in a region with a 0 percent HMO-
penetration rate—that is, in a region with few restraints on its 
financial motivations—the adoption of a noneconomic-damage 
cap is associated with a 0.6 percent increase in the Medicare 
spending rate, an estimate that is statistically indistinguishable 
from 0.105 In other words, when financial incentives are strong, 
liability forces do not appear to be very influential in driving 
spending. However, as demonstrated by the coefficient of the in-
teraction term itself, the effect of damage-cap adoptions falls in 
an absolute sense as we move from a 0 percent HMO-
penetration-rate region to a region with a 100 percent HMO-
penetration rate. To be specific, this estimate suggests that 
damage caps are associated with a roughly 25 percent reduction 
in Medicare spending in such 100-percent-HMO regions, or a 
roughly 3.25 percent reduction in Medicare spending in regions 
with the mean rate of HMO penetration (approximately 13 per-
cent). This latter interpretation of the magnitude of the findings 
is useful in light of the fact that no regions exhibit 100 percent 
HMO penetration. This is consistent with the idea that medical-
liability forces are more influential determinants of health-care 
spending in environments in which financial motivations to 
treat are blunted.106 
  
 
 105 This estimate derives from the estimated coefficient of the damage-cap variable 
in the regression containing the damage-cap and HMO interaction. To interpret the  
coefficient of a constitutive term in an interaction specification of this nature, one essen-
tially views this coefficient as the relationship between that term and the outcome vari-
able of interest (in this case, Medicare spending) under an assumption that the other 
constitutive term equals 0. 
 106 The same coefficients would suggest that the effects of adopting a damage cap on 
Medicare spending go from (1) no effect of caps in those regions with a 0 percent HMO-
penetration rate to (2) a roughly 2.9 percent reduction in spending stemming from caps 
when moving to a region with an HMO-penetration rate that is one standard deviation 
higher (that is, a region with an 11 percent HMO-penetration rate). 
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TABLE 1.  DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES OF THE 
EFFECTS OF CAPS ON MEDICARE SPENDING RATES (LOGGED), 
INTERACTED WITH STATE-YEAR–HMO-PENETRATION RATES 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
 TOTAL MEDICARE PARTS A & B SPENDING RATE 
MEDICARE INPATIENT 
(SHORT-STAY) SPENDING 
RATE  
Noneconomic-Damage-Cap 
Dummy 
0.006 
(0.027) 
0.025 
(0.028) 
0.005 
(0.026) 
0.025 
(0.026) 
HMO-Penetration Rate  
(Min 0, Max 1) 
0.052 
(0.145) 
0.055 
(0.132) 
0.446 
(0.194) 
0.368 
(0.149) 
Interaction Term (Damage Cap 
× HMO-Penetration Rate) 
-0.250** 
(0.122) 
-0.240* 
(0.142) 
-0.268* 
(0.156) 
-0.231 
(0.141) 
Number of Observations 7,913 6,684 7,913 6,684 
Include Controls for Number of 
Hospital Beds in Hospital  
Referral Region? 
NO YES NO YES 
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for within-state correlation in the error term are 
reported in parentheses. All regressions include year fixed effects and are weighted by 
the number of Medicare beneficiaries associated with the relevant region-year cell. Med-
icare data were provided by the Dartmouth Atlas Project. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
 
All told, these findings are precisely consistent with the 
above predictions in demonstrating that defensive medicine—
the rate of which should fall upon the implementation of a cap—
is likely more widespread in situations in which fewer financial 
motivations, which might otherwise crowd out legal forces, are 
present. 
D. More-Substantial Impacts of Malpractice Standard-of-Care 
Reforms 
The framework discussed in Part III explored the conse-
quences of a substantive change in the clinical expectations 
placed on physicians. To the extent that this shift in legal 
standards is substantial enough, this framework predicts a po-
tentially sizeable physician response. Testing the general pre-
dictions of this framework is challenging to the extent that there 
is little policy experimentation along this standard-of-care  
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margin. However, in a recent publication in the American Eco-
nomic Review, I explored whether physicians respond to perhaps 
the most significant standard-of-care reform with which the ma-
jority of states have experimented: a retreat from the historical 
“locality rule” and the contemporaneous adoption of a national 
standard-of-care rule.107 
While malpractice law typically sets operable standards of 
care by determining what physicians actually do under similar 
circumstances,108 malpractice law varies across jurisdictions in 
specifying the set of physicians to which the court should look in 
setting these standards.109 In its early years, malpractice law set 
standards of care by looking to the behavior of physicians prac-
ticing in the same locality as the defendant.110 This traditional 
“locality rule” contained both a substantive and a procedural 
component.111 The substantive component pertained simply to 
the specification of how physicians are expected to behave—that 
is, physicians must follow the practices of local physicians.112 
The procedural restrictions of the traditional rule required that 
plaintiffs use local physicians to testify as to the customary local 
practices, implicating concerns regarding plaintiffs’ abilities to 
find physicians willing to testify against their peers.113 Many 
states amended their malpractice laws by the 1970s to alleviate 
the consequences of this “conspiracy of silence,” either by per-
mitting the use of outside experts familiar with local practices114 
 
 107 Frakes, 103 Am Econ Rev at 266–67, 275 (cited in note 67) (finding that diver-
gent local practices converge toward national-mean practices upon a shift from a rule 
requiring physicians to comply with local customs to a rule requiring physicians to com-
ply with national customs, generally suggesting the empirical relevancy of malpractice 
standards of care). See also generally Michael Frakes, Matthew Frank, and Seth A.  
Seabury, Do Physicians Respond to Liability Standards? (Northwestern Public Law Re-
search Paper No 14-45, Aug 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/M97J-5Q3G (replicating 
the American Economic Review study across a broader surgical context and finding that 
local surgery rates converge toward national surgery rates after national-standard rules 
are adopted). 
 108 See Blumstein, 59 Vand L Rev at 1023–24 (cited in note 14). 
 109 See Frakes, 103 Am Econ Rev at 258 (cited in note 107). 
 110 See id. 
 111 See Michael Frakes, The Impact of Medical Liability Standards on Regional  
Variations in Physician Behavior: Evidence from the Adoption of National-Standard 
Rules; Web Appendix *1–2 (American Economic Association, Feb 2013), archived at 
http://perma.cc/3FA3-3JKC. 
 112 See id at *1. 
 113 See id. 
 114 See, for example, Ardoline v Keegan, 102 A2d 352, 355 (Conn 1954) (“The mere 
fact that a physician has not practiced in the immediate neighborhood in which the 
claimed malpractice has occurred does not necessarily disqualify him from testifying as 
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or by adopting modified locality rules that based standards on 
the practices of physicians in the same locality or in a similar  
locality.115 While relaxing certain evidentiary burdens, courts 
generally did not view these developments as significantly 
changing the substantive requirement that physicians comply 
with local practices.116 
In the latter part of the twentieth century, many jurisdic-
tions further relaxed the geographical limitations in malpractice 
law by abandoning the locality rule in favor of laws requiring 
physicians to comply with national standards of care.117 Courts 
justified this shift by arguing that the initial rationale for the lo-
cality rule had dissipated many years prior with certain early 
twentieth-century advances in the US health-care system,  
including the standardization of medical school curricula, post-
graduate training, and so forth.118 The adoption of a national-
standard rule does more than simply expand the set of physi-
cians who may be called to testify as to customary physician 
practices. To the extent that the previous developments (for ex-
ample, same-or-similar-locality-rule adoptions) were already ef-
fective in opening up the market for willing experts, these sub-
sequent developments can be seen as largely substantive in 
 
to the standards of practice in that locality. The crucial question is whether he knows 
what those standards are.”). 
 115 See Ann MacLean Massie, In Defense of the Professional Standard of Care: A Re-
sponse to Carter Williams on “Evidence-Based Medicine”, 61 Wash & Lee L Rev 535, 
540–41 (2004) (explaining that the rationale for this modified locality rule was “the diffi-
culty of persuading doctors in the same community to testify against each other”). 
 116 Courts have generally viewed the adoption of a similar-locality rule as leading to 
a procedural, as opposed to substantive, modification of the traditional locality rule. As 
stated by the Washington Supreme Court in one of the pioneering locality-rule abdica-
tion cases, “Broadening the rule to include ‘similar localities’ . . . alleviated, to a certain 
extent, the first practical difficulty of the ‘locality rule’—additional witnesses might be 
available; but it did little to remove the deficiencies springing from the second,” that is, 
“the possibility of a small group, who, by their laxness or carelessness, could establish a 
local standard of care that was below that which the law requires.” Pederson v  
Dumouchel, 431 P2d 973, 977 (Wash 1967). 
 117 See Massie, 61 Wash & Lee L Rev at 541 (cited in note 115). 
 118 For instance, the Mississippi Supreme Court employed these arguments to justi-
fy its continuing retreat from the locality rule. See Hall v Hilbun, 466 S2d 856, 870 (Miss 
1985). For a general discussion of the evolutionary developments in malpractice stand-
ard-of-care laws during the twentieth century, see Katharine Van Tassel, Hospital Peer 
Review Standards and Due Process: Moving from Tort Doctrine toward Contract Princi-
ples Based on Clinical Practice Guidelines, 36 Seton Hall L Rev 1179, 1222–26 (2006); 
Massie, 61 Wash & Lee L Rev at 540–43 (cited in note 115). 
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nature and representative of a shift in the care that is actually 
expected of local physicians.119 
This shift in expectations is potentially substantial. A mas-
sive literature in medicine and health economics has document-
ed striking regional variations in health-care practices, across 
almost any kind of clinical setting.120 Such variations have been 
shown to persist even after controlling for variations in de-
mographics, insurance status, and health status, and have gen-
erally been interpreted to constitute regional variations in clini-
cal practice styles121 or in clinical beliefs regarding proper 
practices.122 To the extent that geographic regions vary signifi-
cantly in their clinical practices, one might believe that a change 
in malpractice standard-of-care rules that expects local physi-
cians to begin following the practices applied elsewhere may 
constitute a meaningful alteration of clinical expectations.123 
In a previous exploration into the impact of malpractice-
standard reforms, I used hospital-discharge data from every 
state over the 1977–2005 period and documented that the gap 
between local and national utilization rates for various obstetric 
and cardiac procedures narrowed by as much as 40 to 60 percent 
upon the adoption of a national standard-of-care rule.124 In other 
words, physicians did indeed substantially respond to the new 
 
 119 See Frakes, Web Appendix at *2 (cited in note 111). 
 120 See generally Charles E. Phelps and Cathleen Mooney, Variations in Medical 
Practice Use: Causes and Consequences, in Richard J. Arnould, Robert F. Rich, and Wil-
liam D. White, eds, Competitive Approaches to Health Care Reform 139 (Urban Institute 
1993). 
 121 See, for example, John E. Wennberg, Dealing with Medical Practice Variations: A 
Proposal for Action, 3 Health Affairs 6, 6–7 (1984) (suggesting that the “principal reason 
for the dramatic variations in use of medical care” are variations in the “practice style 
factor,” which capture the attitudes of individual physicians). 
 122 See, for example, Phelps and Mooney, Variations in Medical Practice Use at 153–
54 (cited in note 120) (dismissing alternative explanations and attributing regional vari-
ations to “differences in beliefs about the efficacy of treatment and decisions about which 
patients should receive treatment”). 
 123 See Frakes, 103 Am Econ Rev at 259 (cited in note 67) (“[U]pon the abandonment 
of such rules, physicians in the affected jurisdictions now face expectations to follow the 
customary behaviors followed by physicians nationally.”). 
 124 See id at 260, 266–70. In follow-up work, jointly conducted with Professors Seth 
Seabury and Matthew Frank, we replicated these findings more broadly, documenting 
convergence toward the national mean upon national-standard adoptions in the case of 
total surgery-utilization rates. See generally Frakes, Frank, and Seabury, Do Physicians 
Respond to Liability Standards? (cited in note 107). Data on surgeries (inpatient and 
outpatient) come from the American Hospital Association annual survey of hospitals. See 
Hospital Database (American Hospital Association), archived at http://perma.cc/HVF5 
-C47D (providing links to the most-recent annual surveys). 
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clinical expectations arising from these malpractice-standard re-
forms, with previously divergent local-practice patterns converg-
ing in the direction of the national norm.125 More broadly, such 
findings suggest that physicians are responsive to malpractice 
standards of care—in terms of the above framework, physicians 
may in fact alter their practices in the direction of ̂ݏ following a 
reform that changes the clinical standard from s* to ̂ݏ. 
Interestingly, the results of this evidence converge from 
both the top and bottom of the regional-utilization distribu-
tion.126 That is, in regions that previously had above-average uti-
lization rates under a locality rule, utilization rates fell upon the 
adoption of a national-standard rule.127 Likewise, in regions that 
previously exhibited below-average utilization rates, utilization 
rates increased following national-standard reforms.128 The fact 
that physicians have lowered treatment rates in response to an 
alteration of standards that expects lower treatment rates pro-
vides hope to the cost-containment promise of certain next-
generation medical malpractice reforms—for example, liability 
safe harbors for compliance with specified clinical practice 
guidelines, which I discuss below.129 
E. Supplementary Evidence 
1. Triage. 
Critical to the above model is the notion that physicians will 
rationally treat patients in the order of clinical need—that is, it 
is unlikely that there will be an equilibrium in which those with 
few complications are treated while others with substantial 
 
 125 See Frakes, 103 Am Econ Rev at 275 (cited in note 67). 
 126 See id at 268–70. 
 127 This may be due to a relaxation of previously high standards regarding when 
treatment should be employed, which may have otherwise kept rates high even if some 
physicians may have been motivated by other desires to reduce rates. In the case of such 
physicians, this relaxation may have afforded physicians the ability to lower rates with-
out legal consequences. This downward response in utilization rates may also be a reflec-
tion of tighter standards for when treatment should not be performed. As the discussions 
in Parts II and III emphasize, physicians may indeed face consequences for exposing pa-
tients to the risks and harms associated with treatment. These forces may have been 
limited in initially high-treatment areas under locality rules. When forced to follow the 
arguably less permissive standards practiced elsewhere, however, physicians may have 
been encouraged to stop treating patients on the margin. 
 128 See Frakes, 103 Am Econ Rev at 268–70 (cited in note 67). 
 129 See Part VI. 
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complications are not. Empirical evidence supports this rational 
triaging of patients within regions.130 
2. Physicians’ financial and reimbursement incentives to 
treat. 
Also important to the above analysis is a contention that the 
present health-care environment is characterized by excessive 
utilization deriving from financial incentives for physicians to 
provide more care.131 Whether fee-for-service reimbursement 
structures that compensate physicians more for performing 
more services in fact cause physicians to provide an unnecessari-
ly large number of procedures is the subject of an old and exten-
sive literature.132 While establishing causation in empirical stud-
ies that test this hypothesis is especially challenging,133 the most 
convincing evidence to date suggests that physicians may indeed 
be providing excessive care as a result of such financial  
motivations.134 
3. Health-care quality impacts. 
This Article largely focuses on issues surrounding health-
care costs and utilization of particular health-care services. In a 
related paper with Dr. Anupam Jena, I analyze the impacts of 
both substantive and remedy-centric liability reforms on  
 
 130 See, for example, Frakes, 103 Am Econ Rev at 273 (cited in note 67) (estimating 
that the predicted probability of cesarean delivery—capturing appropriateness for cesar-
ean delivery—becomes smaller and smaller as physicians perform more cesareans in a 
region). 
 131 See Part II.E. 
 132 See generally, for example, McGuire, Physician Agency (cited in note 7). For an 
overview of the empirical literature (up to the year 2000) exploring this hypothesis, see 
id at 509–19. 
 133 See id at 510 (suggesting that most of the early studies of the physician-induced-
demand hypothesis were plagued with concerns over omitted-variable biases). 
 134 See Jonathan Gruber and Maria Owings, Physician Financial Incentives and Ce-
sarean Section Delivery, 27 RAND J Econ 99, 100 (1996) (establishing causation and not 
mere correlation). Professor Jonathan Gruber and Maria Owings observed how obstetri-
cians and gynecologists responded to a negative income shock deriving from an arguably 
exogenous source: the 13.5 percent fall in fertility rates in the United States between 
1970 and 1982. See id. Exploring the hypothesis that this income shock would incentiv-
ize physicians to cover the resulting deficiency through the provision of the more lucra-
tive cesarean-delivery option, Gruber and Owings found that physicians made up some 
of their income loss through an increase in cesarean deliveries. See id at 113–14. 
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prevailing measures of health-care quality.135 The measures in-
vestigated are mostly derived from the quality indicators devel-
oped by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality136 and 
capture such things as inpatient mortality rates for selected 
medical conditions (for example, heart attacks), avoidable-
hospitalization rates (a metric indicative of outpatient-care qual-
ity), maternal trauma or complications during deliveries, and 
cancer-screening rates. 
Lending further support to the theory and findings dis-
cussed in this Article, the results from this separate quality-
focused analysis largely mirror the pattern presented above for 
the case of the cost- and treatment-focused analysis.137 That is, 
for each of the quality indicators explored, the estimated im-
pacts of damage-cap adoptions are relatively tightly bound 
around zero, suggesting that liability forces may, at most, lead 
to only a minor improvement in quality.138 However, for each of 
the indicators explored, when liability standards are altered to 
demand that physicians deliver higher-quality care, the  
observed quality indicators improve substantially beyond their 
baseline levels.139 Interestingly, however, when liability stand-
ards change so as to arguably condone lower-quality care, we 
find that physicians do not respond by reducing the quality of 
their practices.140 
V.  NORM ADJUSTMENTS 
What would happen if a jurisdiction were to adopt a mal-
practice-standard reform changing the clinical expectations 
placed on physicians and thereafter remove the liability system 
altogether? Liability-standard reforms would possibly push 
practices in the direction of the new expectations. Would the 
subsequent removal of liability pressures cause practices to drift 
 
 135 See generally Michael Frakes and Anupam B. Jena, Does Medical Malpractice 
Law Improve Health Care Quality? (National Bureau of Economic Research Working  
Paper No 19841, Jan 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/HL5N-6NGN. 
 136 See Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Introduction (US Department 
of Health and Human Services), archived at http://perma.cc/X46R-HRCS. 
 137 See Frakes and Jena, Does Medical Malpractice Law Improve Health Care Quali-
ty? at *35–36 (cited in note 135) (“The confidence bounds presented in our analysis sug-
gest, at most, a modest degree of deterrence stemming from the present liability  
system.”). 
 138 See id at *25–31. 
 139 See id at *31–34. 
 140 See id. 
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back to where they were prior to the change in clinical expecta-
tions resulting from the malpractice-standards reform? Or might 
practices remain entrenched at the equilibrium that they had 
shifted to subsequent to the reform? I phrase the question in 
this manner to motivate an analysis of whether alterations of 
the clinical standards expected of physicians under the law may 
change medical norms in a more permanent sense or whether 
such responses are transitory in nature. To the extent that such 
responses are of the former variety, I contend that the above 
analysis understates the extent to which medical-liability law 
may impact the clinical landscape. To understand the persis-
tence that may arise from malpractice-standard reforms, it is 
necessary to understand the mechanisms underlying their re-
sulting impacts on clinical practices. 
The framework set forth in Part III conceptualizes physi-
cians responding to liability forces in the conventionally ex-
pected manner—that is, fear over liability for failing to comply 
with the expected standard of care incentivizes them to take 
particular actions. To the extent that liability fears are the only 
forces responsible for the observed changes in behavior, it is 
perhaps the case that such inclinations to deviate from the pre-
viously desired practices may persist only as long as the liability 
threat in general remains viable. However, there may be reason 
to believe that the impact of a liability-standard reform is  
stickier than that. 
To begin, such reforms may incite responses through chan-
nels beyond liability fears themselves. Consider, for instance, an 
information channel. Moreover, imagine a malpractice-standard 
reform of the variety discussed in Part IV.D—that is, a retreat 
from a locality rule and a contemporaneous adoption of a na-
tional-standard rule. Many have theorized that the divergent 
pathways of medicine commonly observed across different re-
gions of the United States are the result of physician-learning 
models in which physicians form beliefs about proper clinical 
practices using largely local sources of information—for exam-
ple, their own prior experiences or the experiences of those 
around them—to the relative exclusion of more national sources 
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of information.141 A locality rule would operate to reinforce this 
limited informational perspective.142 
Now, consider the adoption of a rule requiring physicians to 
comply with national standards of care. During subsequent trial 
proceedings, standard-of-care evaluations will entail the consid-
eration of practices followed in other regions. In other words, lo-
cal proceedings may now be flooded by national sources of in-
formation regarding proper practices. Physicians may have 
previously disregarded this information for a number of reasons, 
including cognitive and resource limitations or desires to follow 
more experience-based learning.143 Nonetheless, to the extent 
that this new information is perhaps more salient given its at-
tachment to the liability system, it may register with physicians 
and lead them to update their prior beliefs.144 That is, the infor-
mational exposure resulting from the liability reform may cause 
physicians to reevaluate their opinions regarding proper medi-
cine. Whatever response falls along such informational lines 
should persist even were liability pressure subsequently reduced 
via a noneconomic-damage-cap reform or an even more severe 
retreat from the medical-liability system. 
Relatedly, even if practices do not immediately shift from an 
updating of clinical beliefs due to this informational exposure, 
any alteration of practices that arises from the liability-fear 
channel may persist over time in the face of an experience-based 
learning environment. After all, if physicians, especially newer 
physicians, form beliefs about proper practices largely through 
their own past experiences and through observing the practices 
of others around them, then a shift in medical practices that 
arises in any manner—for example, a shift that arises from fear 
 
 141 See, for example, Phelps and Mooney, Variations in Medical Practice Use at 154–
57 (cited in note 120) (“[C]umulative experience will move the doctor toward the commu-
nity norm.”). 
 142 See Frakes, 103 Am Econ Rev at 259 (cited in note 67). This information channel 
is perhaps similar to Professor Stephen Smith’s arguments regarding the role of damag-
es in tort law, which may serve more to “vindicate” rights and send messages to the 
community regarding the wrongdoing of the relevant actions than to enforce rights and 
incentivize compliance with the underlying duties. Stephen A. Smith, Duties, Liabilities, 
and Damages, 125 Harv L Rev 1727, 1753–56 (2012). 
 143 Much has been said about the fantastical amount of time that a physician would 
have to spend reading the medical literature in order to keep up. See, for example, Brian 
S. Alper, et al, How Much Effort Is Needed to Keep Up with the Literature Relevant for 
Primary Care?, 92 J Med Library Assoc 429, 433 (2004) (estimating that physicians 
trained in epidemiology would need to spend 627.5 hours per month to evaluate new  
articles in those journals publishing matters relevant to primary care).  
 144 See Frakes, 103 Am Econ Rev at 259 (cited in note 67). 
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of failure to comply with changed legal expectations—may more 
gradually come to be assimilated into the belief structure of 
physicians over time.145 
Finally, it is possible that some portion of the observed re-
sponse to a shift in medical-liability standards may arise not 
from a change in practice styles by any given physician but ra-
ther from a change in the composition of physicians in the local 
market. Consider a rural region that follows a less intensive 
practice style and that initially complies with a locality rule. As 
suggested above, under such a rule, the law may actually expect 
the maintenance of this low-intensity style. As such, local hospi-
tals contemplating the recruitment of surgical specialists for 
admitting privileges might hesitate in light of this legal expecta-
tion. Physicians with such dispositions may likewise hesitate to 
relocate (or initially locate) to such regions.146 This hesitation 
may relax after the adoption of a reform expecting physicians to 
follow national standards. Moreover, following such reforms, 
even if local hospitals had not been contemplating recruitment 
of such physicians previously, they may now be compelled to do 
so. To the extent that a shift in the composition of local physi-
cians in the direction of more surgical specialists does result 
from national-standard adoptions, it could explain some of the 
observed changes in procedure rates discussed in Part IV. Fur-
thermore, to the extent that there is some persistence in physi-
cians’ locational decisions, the resulting influence on local medi-
cal practices may likewise persist in such situations even if the 
jurisdiction subsequently reduces liability forces through a 
damage cap or similar reform. Through research that I have 
done jointly with Professors Seabury and Frank, I have found 
evidence suggesting that the observed shift in medical practices 
following the adoption of rules expecting physicians to follow na-
tional standards may be a reflection of both existing physicians 
altering their practices and a partial shift in the compositional 
mix of physicians of this hypothesized nature.147 
 
 145 See Phelps and Mooney, Variations in Medical Practice Use at 154–57 (cited in 
note 120). 
 146 See Frakes, Frank, and Seabury, Do Physicians Respond to Liability Standards? 
at *4 (cited in note 107) (“Regardless of the precise cause, medical liability ‘locality rules’ 
may operate to cement these regionally distinct practice styles, either by discouraging 
physicians from deviating from those local customs that have developed or by providing 
comfort to physicians wishing to maintain such customs.”). 
 147 See id at *10–12. In general, I note that the observed shift in medical practices 
persists even when controlling for fluctuations in relevant physician population rates, 
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While further research is needed to fully illuminate the 
mechanisms behind the observed responses to a change in mal-
practice-liability standards, this discussion nonetheless  
reinforces the ways in which medical malpractice law may shape 
medical practices. It also helps elucidate how damage-cap adop-
tions and similar reforms may not necessarily fully unwind the 
influences of more-substantive reforms to the liability landscape 
that were passed in prior years. 
VI.  IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
A. The Continuing Relevance of Malpractice Law 
In the present environment, financial incentives and certain 
other factors may be elevating treatment rates and health-care 
spending so much that they leave little for liability forces to do 
on the margin.148 As a result, the solution to reducing health-
care spending through a liability reform cannot be one that tries 
to dampen the influence of general liability fears themselves—
for example, through the adoption of damage caps. Instead of 
thinking about how to strip away the influence of medical mal-
practice, why not try to harness liability forces to push health-
care spending in the desired direction? Yes, many factors en-
courage providing excessive care.149 Take, for instance, financial 
incentives stemming from a fee-for-service reimbursement envi-
ronment. Why not try to temper such financial incentives by ex-
posing physicians to liability for succumbing to them? Taking a 
new approach to determining liability standards may generate 
this result. Even if one tried to remove the liability system or 
heavily blunt its impact through a stringent  
 
suggesting that physician locational shifts likely do not tell the entire story here.  
Moreover, the physician composition mix does not change substantially upon the adop-
tion of a national-standard reform in those regions with initially high-intensity practice 
styles, even though we otherwise observed a decrease in treatment rates toward the na-
tional norm in connection with national-standard reforms in such regions, likewise sug-
gesting that part of this story likely stems from existing physicians in those regions al-
tering their practice styles. However, in practice areas that are initially low intensity, we 
documented robust evidence of a roughly 2 to 2.4 percent swing in the surgeon-versus-
nonsurgeon composition mix away from nonsurgeons and toward surgeons subsequent to 
national-standard adoptions, consistent with the above physician-location hypothesis. 
This may not explain the full 8 to 10 percent increase in surgical treatment rates that we 
observed in this region at such times, but it may explain a respectable portion of it. See 
id at *11.  
 148 See Part II.E. 
 149 See Orentlicher, 6 FIU L Rev at 71 (cited in note 45). 
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noneconomic-damage cap, a medical system fraught with excess 
will still remain. Substantive liability reforms that focus on 
when liability should be triggered in the first instance—as op-
posed to damage-cap-esque reforms that focus on remedies 
should liability attach—hold the potential to change practice 
norms and to instigate a retreat from this excess.150 
In the past, a majority of states have undergone some modi-
fications to the manner in which their tort system evaluates 
physician behavior—that is, by abdicating the arguably arcane 
locality rule.151 While not necessarily retreating from a custom-
based approach to liability standards, national-standard adop-
tions nonetheless represented a substantive change in the clini-
cal expectations placed on physicians, effectively moving from 
one kind of custom-based system (a local one) to another (a na-
tional one).152 My previous research suggests that these reforms 
did in fact partially change practice norms, reducing regional 
disparities in practices and bringing procedure-utilization rates 
closer to their respective national means.153 I emphasize that 
this Article is not advocating for a universal embracement of na-
tional-standard rules in their present form. After all, while na-
tionalizing standards may reduce practice disparities and create 
greater uniformity in practices around national norms, it is un-
clear whether such customary norms are themselves optimal.154 
As we know, customary practices are already characterized by 
both excessive spending155 and inadequate quality.156 Rather, I 
 
 150 For a general argument regarding the distinction between remedy-centered re-
forms (for example, damage caps) and liability-determination reforms (for example, mal-
practice standard-of-care reforms) and the perhaps greater power of the latter to reduce 
health-care costs, see generally Blumstein, 59 Vand L Rev 1017 (cited in note 14). 
 151 See Part IV.D. 
 152 See Frakes, Web Appendix at *2 (cited in note 111). 
 153 See Frakes, 103 Am Econ Rev at 275 (cited in note 67). 
 154 Some scholars have estimated that the deadweight losses arising from regional 
disparities in physician practices (due to deviations from ideal practices) are on par, in 
the aggregate, with the total deadweight losses arising from moral hazard in health in-
surance contexts. See, for example, Phelps and Mooney, Variations in Medical Practice 
Use at 169 (cited in note 120) (noting that a “fully insured person would have $265 of 
loss, all due to ‘moral hazard’ increased consumption” while estimating a “$130 per  
capita in welfare loss due to hospital admissions variations”). 
 155 See id. 
 156 See Elizabeth McGlynn, et al, The Quality of Health Care Delivered to Adults in 
the United States, 348 New Eng J Med 2635, 2636, 2641 (2003) (demonstrating that par-
ticipants in a phone survey had received only 54.9 percent of the recommended care). 
Professor Blumstein effectively raises the same point regarding the combination of cus-
tomary standards and generally undesirable practices. See Blumstein, 59 Vand L Rev at 
1025 (cited in note 14).  
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emphasize national-standard adoptions in this Article largely 
because they provide the best experimental setting to date by 
which to explore the general empirical relevancy of malpractice 
standard-of-care rules themselves. Having established this rele-
vancy, the above analysis thus demonstrates that physician 
practices may likewise respond in the intended direction upon 
the adoption of a standard-of-care reform that is perhaps better 
designed to push practices in the preferred direction—primarily, 
toward lower costs and improved quality of care. One such re-
form that has generated substantial discussion entails a retreat 
from the custom-centered approaches to setting liability stand-
ards and a move toward the more definitive use of CPGs in their 
place.157 
B.  CPGs as the Basis for Malpractice Standards 
As an introductory point, note that the liability standards 
expected under a guidelines-based approach could differ sub-
stantially from those under the present custom-dominated sys-
tem. Put simply, physicians customarily deviate from guideline-
recommended care at a staggering rate. In an influential 2003 
study, Elizabeth A. McGlynn and colleagues used medical rec-
ords from a random sample of adults and found that the partici-
pants received only 54.9 percent of recommended care according 
to a set of 439 guideline indicators.158 CPGs may be, and some-
times are, introduced as evidence in medical malpractice suits; 
however, given the structure of current liability-standard rules, 
such evidence is generally introduced to prove customary prac-
tices when such guidelines are more heavily embraced.159 The 
essence of guidelines-based reform proposals is to give CPGs de-
terminative weight in questions of liability standards, regard-
less of whether such guidelines are presently being followed by 
practitioners—that is, not to use CPGs merely as evidence to 
 
 157 CPGs, as defined by the Institute of Medicine, are “statements that include rec-
ommendations intended to optimize patient care that are informed by a systematic re-
view of evidence and an assessment of the benefits and harms of alternative care op-
tions.” Committee on Standards for Developing Trustworthy Clinical Practice 
Guidelines, Institute of Medicine, Clinical Practice Guidelines We Can Trust *15  
(National Academy of Sciences, Mar 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/SMD3-QLS5. 
 158 McGlynn, 348 New Eng J Med at 2636–37, 2641 (cited in note 156). 
 159 See OTA Report at 142 (cited in note 81) (“Under the current customary standard 
of care, clinical practice guidelines can only influence the standard to the extent that 
they are adopted into common medical practice.”). 
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support the operable customary standards, but to use CPGs as 
the standards themselves.160 
Peter Orszag, former director of the Office of Management 
and Budget under the Obama administration, stated the follow-
ing in an editorial published in the New York Times shortly fol-
lowing the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act:161 
The health care legislation that Congress enacted earlier 
this year . . . does almost nothing to reform medical mal-
practice laws. Lawmakers missed an important opportunity 
to shield from malpractice liability any doctors who followed 
evidence-based guidelines in treating their patients. . . . 
How might we encourage doctors to adopt new evidence 
more quickly? Malpractice reform could help. . . . The tradi-
tional way to reform medical malpractice law has been to 
impose caps on liability. . . . A far better strategy would be 
to provide safe harbor for doctors who follow evidence-based 
guidelines.162 
Orszag’s proposal, as stated, essentially provides physicians 
with a “shield”163 to avoid liability upon compliance with a rele-
vant guideline. Proposals that embrace a shield-only approach 
often defer to the traditional custom-based liability system to 
evaluate the propriety of a physician’s care should she fail to 
comply with the relevant guideline.164 Why exactly should we 
expect physicians to respond to the imposition of a safe harbor 
when the regular system exists as a backdrop and physicians 
are already only weakly responsive to the present custom-based 
system? As demonstrated in Part II, the limited responsiveness 
inherent in the present system may, in part, be attributable to 
the particular way in which the relative health risks for the 
marginal patient balance out. Nonetheless, the uncertainty as-
sociated with this balancing assessment likely leads to some 
 
 160 See Blumstein, 59 Vand L Rev at 1036 (cited in note 14). 
 161 Pub L No 111-148, 124 Stat 119 (2010). 
 162 Orszag, NY Times at A39 (cited in note 15). 
 163 Michelle M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice Guide-
lines in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 149 U Pa L Rev 645, 648 (2001) (“Physicians 
would operate under less uncertainty, and consequently would practice medicine less 
defensively. Additionally, physicians would have an incentive to comply with CPGs, 
which represent our best estimate of what constitutes good quality care.”). 
 164 See, for example, Ronen Avraham, Private Regulation, 34 Harv J L & Pub Pol 
543, 571–72 (2011) (discussing Maine’s brief experimentation with the use of CPGs as a 
liability shield while disallowing the use of CPGs for inculpatory purposes). 
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anxiety for the physician. To the extent that the precise ex ante 
standards inherent in a set of guidelines provide physicians with 
greater certainty regarding the law’s clinical expectations than 
is afforded under the present ex post process of determining 
standards, physicians may welcome the diminished risk afforded 
by this shield.165 Accordingly, even with the traditional system 
as a backdrop, physicians may still feel inclined to adjust their 
practices so as to fall under this shield. 
Of course, other proposed standard-of-care reforms go even 
further in advocating abandonment of the present custom-based 
system, more completely surrendering (at least for a subset of 
clinical scenarios) the liability-determination process to whether 
the physician complied with the operable set of guidelines.166 
Under this broader overhaul, CPGs may act both as a shield—
protecting physicians who comply with the standards—and a 
sword, giving courts a basis to find a physician negligent for fail-
ing to comply with the specified standards.167 This formulation of 
a CPG-based system more closely fits into the framework speci-
fied in Part III and thus with its predictions. 
If malpractice law were hypothetically to embrace a reason-
able-physician approach to setting liability standards that fol-
lows a Learned Hand type of cost-benefit philosophy to reasona-
bleness,168 then standard-of-care determinations would indeed 
turn on considerations of costs. While deference to custom with-
in tort law (as distinct from this abstract reasonableness in-
quiry) may not necessarily abandon cost-benefit considerations 
as a general matter,169 a customary approach within the present 
medical context is bound to thwart cost-containment goals in 
 
 165 Blumstein asserted that the uncertainty-reducing effect of a CPG-based–
standard-setting system is among that system’s chief benefits. See Blumstein, 59 Vand L 
Rev at 1031 (cited in note 14). 
 166 See id at 1036–37. 
 167 See id. 
 168 See United States v Carroll Towing Co, 159 F2d 169, 173 (2d Cir 1947) (framing 
the cost-benefit analysis as a function of whether the burden of the precaution is less 
than the probability that injury will occur multiplied by the magnitude of that injury). 
 169 See, for example, Rodi Yachts, Inc v National Marine, Inc, 984 F2d 880, 889 (7th 
Cir 1993): 
Since . . . these customs appear to reflect an undistorted market determination 
of the best way to minimize runaway-barge accidents, we think the focus of the 
district court’s inquiry should be on the parties’ respective compliance with and 
departures from the customs and that the judge and the parties should not feel 
compelled to conduct a cost benefit analysis of barge transportation from the 
ground up. 
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light of the many other factors—for example, pay-for-service re-
imbursement—that drive customary practices to the point at 
which physicians perform treatments with benefits that cannot 
be justified by the costs.170 CPG-based approaches to determin-
ing liability standards hold the promise of bringing us to the 
point of cost consciousness. Advocates for the use of CPGs in the 
tort context generally suggest adopting guidelines that not only 
derive from evidence-based medicine but that are also designed 
with cost-containment goals in mind.171 
C.  CPG Proposals: Future Steps 
One of the key aims of this Article has been to demonstrate 
the continuing significance of medical liability as a possible in-
fluence on physician behavior, especially with respect to liability 
rules bearing on the substance of the evaluative process. As 
such, this analysis is meant to set the stage for a perhaps even 
larger discussion regarding how liability standards should be 
structured. In this light, I have given a brief overview of CPG-
based proposals. It is beyond the scope of this Article to fully 
evaluate the merits of such ideas. Among other things, a more 
complete analysis must address a number of critical questions. 
First, how can such proposals be implemented? CPGs are 
meant to reflect recommendations of appropriate care under the 
relevant set of medical circumstances. However, the number of 
potential combinations of patient circumstances is likely to be 
overwhelmingly large, complicating the ability of inherently  
rigid structures such as guidelines to dictate the appropriate 
care in all circumstances. Many of the guidelines that have been 
developed and advocated by patient-safety groups and organiza-
tions to date “tend to be broad and flexible in nature.”172 Howev-
er, to be useful as an ex ante device for standard setting in mal-
practice cases, guidelines should aim to be more precise.173 
Moreover, to facilitate the goal of certainty in malpractice-
standard determinations, there should be a single, identifiable 
set of guidelines to which physicians subscribe.174 At present, the 
National Guidelines Clearinghouse contains nearly 2,700  
 
 170 See, for example, Blumstein, 59 Vand L Rev at 1035 (cited in note 14). 
 171 See id at 1034. 
 172 Mello, 149 U Penn L Rev at 650 (cited in note 163). 
 173 See Blumstein, 59 Vand L Rev at 1033 (cited in note 14). 
 174 See id. 
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guidelines.175 How should guidelines themselves be selected and 
constructed? Through legislation?176 Through legislative delega-
tion to administrative agencies?177 Through contract?178 This is 
no simple question. Relatedly, concerns may arise in ensuring 
that whatever approach is taken is protected from regulatory 
capture by interested parties.179 
Second, how can we continue to foster a culture of innova-
tion within medicine while at the same time implementing a 
new system that is designed to encourage uniformity in practic-
es? This captures one of the classic struggles in medicine.180 In 
our effort to take a scientific approach to medical care, we may 
want physicians to coalesce around the medically optimal 
point;181 however, we must continue to nurture the scientific pro-
cess by constantly challenging our present state of knowledge—
that is, through varied experimentation. Related concerns over 
the CPG approach emphasize the alteration of the fundamental 
nature of medicine itself—that is, concerns over a push toward 
“cookbook medicine.”182 
  
 
 175 See Committee on Standards for Developing Trustworthy Clinical Practice 
Guidelines, Clinical Practice Guidelines at *2 (cited in note 157). 
 176 See Arnold J. Rosoff, Evidence-Based Medicine and the Law: The Courts Confront 
Clinical Practice Guidelines, 26 J Health Polit, Pol & L 327, 329 (2001) (noting that  
using guidelines as applicable legal standards would likely require legislative action). 
 177 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schecter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation 
Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 Yale L J 1399, 1402 (2000) (advocating agency 
standard setting more generally). 
 178 See Clark C. Havighurst, Practice Guidelines as Legal Standards Governing 
Physician Liability, 54 L & Contemp Probs 87, 108 (1991) (“[T]he law might contemplate 
that the physician’s duty in a given malpractice case might be found in the contract be-
tween the physician and the patient.”). Professor Ronen Avraham proposed a clever “pri-
vate regulation” regime in which medical providers contract with guideline-generating 
bodies that insulate providers from liability should the bodies’ set of guidelines be fol-
lowed by the providers, and patients sue the guideline-generating entities in order to 
challenge the guidelines as suboptimal in nature. Avraham, 34 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 
552–53 (cited in note 164). 
 179 See Havighurst, 54 L & Contemp Probs at 92 (cited in note 178). 
 180 See David A. Shaywitz, Problems with Obama’s Drive to Standardize Care (Wash 
Post, Sept 17, 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/C44U-XHXJ (“Our health-care system is 
now facing a problem that has plagued business leaders for years: how do you balance 
consistency and innovation?”). 
 181 See Blumstein, 59 Vand L Rev at 1022 (cited in note 14). 
 182 Havighurst, 54 L & Contemp Probs at 105 (cited in note 178). 
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CONCLUSION 
Despite the relatively weak role that medical liability may 
play in contributing to health-care costs in the present health-
care landscape and under the present liability system, medical 
liability may nonetheless remain a quite relevant influence on 
physician practices in a more universal sense. One perhaps  
cannot claim that physicians will disregard liability in all possi-
ble scenarios and under all possible constructions of our liability 
system. In collapsing the connection between medical liability 
and health-care spending into a discussion about defensive medi-
cine—a concept that generally assesses how a particular liability 
system impacts health-care spending on the margin—the partic-
ipants in this discussion have failed to ask what impacts on 
spending may derive from shifting to a new system altogether, 
one that involves an entirely different way of evaluating physi-
cian behavior. Documenting the relevance of malpractice law’s 
physician-evaluation process, the above analysis suggests that 
systematic reforms of this nature may indeed hold the potential 
for substantial cost savings. 
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APPENDIX 
A. Overview 
The analysis in Parts II and III of this Article contemplated 
a simple physician-decisionmaking context—that is, the simple 
decision whether to treat a patient given his complication level. 
Potential theories of liability within this framework rested simp-
ly on whether the decision to treat or not treat (given the com-
plication level) was appropriate. This framework did not consid-
er a second dimension of this decisionmaking context—one 
based on the level of care exercised in the treatment itself. In 
other words, in Parts II and III, the potential liability stemming 
from the treatment decision would be a result of unnecessarily 
or negligently exposing the patient to the harms of treatment 
when the operable standard of care expected that the physician 
take the nonintensive approach under the circumstances. It 
would not stem from the possibility of a botched treatment, 
whereby the physician fails to follow the proper standards of 
care during treatment. 
In this Appendix, I demonstrate that consideration of this 
second dimension to physician decisionmaking does not at all al-
ter the basic conclusions and predictions from Parts II and III. 
Effectively, even when considering the possibility of lawsuits for 
improper treatment execution, one might predict that, in our 
present environment and with our present liability system, lia-
bility forces will likely not compel physicians on the margin to 
perform a substantially greater number of treatments.183 Like-
wise, in the face of this alternative theory of liability, a more 
substantive alteration of the clinical standards expected of phy-
sicians will nonetheless induce physicians to amend their prac-
tices in the direction of these modified standards. 
Failures to follow treatment-execution standards may arise 
in two ways. First, certain physicians may, as a general matter 
of course, disregard specified treatment standards—for example, 
they may generally fail to perform a hysterectomy that other 
physicians would customarily perform. Second, as a general 
matter of course, physicians may indeed follow customary 
treatment standards. However, due to simple “slips,” they may 
fail to conform to their customs on certain occasions. After all, 
we are all human! Situations of this latter nature are known as 
 
 183 See Part II. 
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“compliance errors.”184 While one may argue that mere slips of 
this nature should not justify liability (insofar as attempting to 
avoid such slips 100 percent of the time may entail unnecessari-
ly high levels of precaution), these occurrences are still generally 
subject to liability.185 
For the sake of simplicity, I will confront the analysis in this 
Appendix by reference to a compliance error, as opposed to a 
general disregard of treatment standards. 
B. Consideration of Treatment Compliance Errors in Part II 
Supplementing the analysis from Part II to consider the role 
of compliance errors is quite straightforward. The key prediction 
of Part II was that medical-liability pressure on the margin in 
the present custom-based system of liability would likely not ex-
ert much expansionary influence on treatment rates, largely due 
to the fact that financial and other determinants of clinical prac-
tice styles have already brought us to an equilibrium (before 
even considering liability’s influence) with treatment rates that 
are so elevated that the marginal patients receiving treatment 
are quite healthy and likely face greater treatment-related risks 
than underlying condition-related risks. In short, medical liabil-
ity on the margin is not substantially incentivizing greater costs 
and more treatments. How might the possibility of liability for 
compliance errors in the execution of treatments alter this  
conclusion? 
At least in terms of evaluating the number of treatments 
performed, this new consideration does not alter the conclusion 
that expansionary defensive medicine appears to be less pro-
nounced than lay commentators might expect. After all, liability 
fears based on compliance errors may operate to induce physi-
cians to perform fewer, not more, treatments. That is, fears over 
botching a treatment may not be expected to induce physicians 
to perform more treatments. As such, consideration of compli-
ance errors provides another basis to understand why physi-
cians, in the face of one of the healthy, marginal patients at is-
sue, may not be overly concerned with possible liability for 
failing to treat such patients. With respect to such healthy pa-
tients, expected damages based on these failure-to-treat  
 
 184 Mark F. Grady, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Compliance Error, 142 U Pa L Rev 887, 
897–98 (1994). 
 185 See id at 906. 
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lawsuits may simply be swamped by expected damages based on 
either (1) improper-decision-to-treat lawsuits or (2) compliance-
error (that is, failure-to-properly-execute) lawsuits. As such,  
liability forces are unlikely to substantially induce more treat-
ments on the margin. Considerations of compliance errors simp-
ly bolster the arguments set forth in Part II.186 
C. Consideration of Treatment Compliance Errors in Part III 
Part III considered a situation in which physicians, as a re-
sult of their clinical beliefs and various financial and other in-
fluences, customarily follow a treatment cutoff point of s*. To fa-
cilitate an understanding of how physicians might respond to a 
reform to liability standards of care that expects physicians to 
follow a lower treatment rate, I considered the impact of retreat-
ing from a custom-based–standard-of-care rule (that would have 
otherwise expected physicians to follow an s* cutoff) and adopt-
ing a new approach that expects physicians to follow a treat-
ment cutoff to the right of s* at ̂ݏ, thus representing a lower 
treatment rate. 
As in Part III, begin by considering a physician that  
attempts to maintain her otherwise-desired practice style by 
treating patients once their complication levels rise to s*. This 
physician would immediately expose herself to possible liability 
under this modified standard-of-care regime. More specifically, 
for those patients with complication levels falling between s* 
and ̂ݏ	on the complication distribution, the physician would oth-
erwise desire to treat, but liability fears may cause her to recon-
sider. How this liability-induced hesitation may arise depends 
on the nature of the negligence alleged by the patient. The exe-
cution of a treatment—for example, surgery—carries risks in 
and of itself. Some of these risks may arise from the inherent 
nature of surgery and be unavoidable—for example, anesthetic 
complications. Other risks may be attributable to the commis-
sion of error itself in the execution of the treatment. In light of 
 
 186 Of course, the analysis here views treatment rates as the key determinant of 
health-care costs. It overlooks the possibility that physicians may, in response to compli-
ance-error liability fears, run up health-care costs as they take more-expensive precau-
tions during the course of any given treatment. This possibility could balance out the 
generally negative force that compliance-error concerns place on treatment rates them-
selves, leaving the overall effect on health-care costs stemming from compliance-based 
concerns ambiguous. Of course, these expansionary pressures would have to be substan-
tial in order for such considerations to alter the conclusions of Part II. 
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these risks, to the extent that the patient is harmed from the 
treatment, liability suits arise from two types of arguments, de-
pending on the circumstances: (1) that the patient was exposed 
unnecessarily—that is, negligently—to treatment and (2) that 
the patient was harmed as a result of a negligent compliance  
error.187 
Part III demonstrated that considering the first type of 
these lawsuits may induce physicians to alter their practices in 
the direction of these new expectations—that is, in the direction 
of ̂ݏ. How about the possibility of a lawsuit based on compliance 
error? 
To the extent that physicians attempt to maintain custom 
and thus continue to treat patients with complication levels in 
the range between s* and ̂ݏ—such that the now-altered standard 
of care at court suggests that treatment is not needed—such 
physicians expose themselves to the possibility of a lawsuit 
based on a compliance error committed during the treatment it-
self (again, this lawsuit would be distinct from that based on the 
performance of an unnecessary surgery). Of course, in our 
benchmark state in which liability standards were set at cus-
tom—that is, at s*—physicians were also treating patients in 
this range and could also be subject to a malpractice suit based 
on the commission of a compliance error during the treatment. 
However, at least in this benchmark scenario, if the physician 
were to not treat in order to avoid compliance-error liability 
risks altogether, she would likely be subject to liability for fail-
ing to treat patients in this range between s* and ̂ݏ. After all, 
under custom, such patients are supposed to be treated. If com-
pliance errors are rare, it is likely that, under the baseline sce-
nario (that is, custom-based standards), liability risks from fail-
ing to treat these patients and thus failing to eliminate the 
harms of the underlying medical condition would trump these 
compliance-error concerns. In that case, liability forces under 
the custom-based standard would indeed reinforce the custom-
ary inclinations to treat all such patients. 
However, under the modified standard of care presently of 
interest—that is, with an expected cutoff at ̂ݏ—the physician 
could avoid treatment and face no liability consequences for that 
decision. In this instance, consider her response to fears over 
 
 187 Part II, for simplicity purposes, focused on lawsuits of this first variety. See note 
35. To facilitate a more comprehensive analysis, I now expand to consider both risks as-
sociated with treatment. 
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compliance-error-based lawsuits. Such lawsuits may induce her 
to avoid treating patients in this range, thus avoiding the possi-
bility of committing a compliance error. But now the counter-
vailing force discussed in the preceding paragraph has been lift-
ed. There are no forces compelling her to treat these patients 
considering that the new standard of care makes no such expec-
tations. As such, with the only force at issue being such compli-
ance errors (on top of the unnecessary-surgery fears discussed in 
Part III), physicians may be compelled to avoid treating patients 
in this range between ̂ݏ and s*. Accordingly, when the law un-
dergoes a substantive reformation of what it expects of  
physicians clinically—in this instance, a lower treatment rate—
physician practices may respond appropriately to the new  
incentives. 
In other words, if a jurisdiction modifies its standard-of-care 
rules and expects physicians to lower their treatment intensi-
ties, fears over lawsuits based on compliance errors may encour-
age the resulting drop in treatment intensities. This analysis fo-
cuses on a situation in which the standard of care expected 
under the law was modified to induce a lower treatment rate. I 
discuss reforms of this nature because of this Article’s focus on 
questions of cost containment. A slightly modified version of the 
discussion in this Appendix and in Part III could assess the in-
centives in play for a modification of a standard-of-care ap-
proach that expects physicians to now practice at greater inten-
sities. While I omit this discussion for brevity’s sake, under 
certain specified conditions, physicians may indeed find them-
selves compelled to increase their treatment rates in the direc-
tion of such new expectations—for example, as a result of liabil-
ity fears arising from not treating those marginal patients now 
in the range in which the court expects treatment. 
D. Regression Analysis: The Sensitivity of Damage-Cap Effects 
on Spending to the Prevalence of HMO-Penetration Rates 
To explore whether the effect of caps on spending intensifies 
as one moves toward regions with higher HMO-penetration 
rates, I estimate the following specification: 
ܮ݋݃൫ܥ௦,௥,௧൯ ൌ 	ߙ	 ൅	ߣ௧ ൅ ߮௥ 	൅	ߚଵܥܣ ௦ܲ,௧ ൅ ߚଶܪܯܱ௦,௧ ൅	ߚଷሺܥܣܲ	 ൈ ܪܯܱሻ௦,௧ ൅	ߝ௦,௥,௧ 
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where s indexes state, r indexes a hospital referral region, and t 
indexes year. CAPs,t represents an indicator variable for the 
presence of a cap on noneconomic damages in state s and year t. 
HMOs,t represents the share of individuals enrolled in an HMO 
plan in state s and year t. Year fixed effects, λt, and hospital-
referral-region fixed effects, ߮௥, control for fixed differences 
across years and hospital referral regions, respectively. Cs,t  
represents the relevant Medicare Parts A and B spending rate 
(per beneficiary) for the given state and year. The coefficient of 
interest in this specification is captured by ߚଷ, representing the 
degree to which the spending and damage-cap relationship itself 
is stronger as the relevant HMO-penetration rate increases. 
The mean Medicare spending rate per beneficiary in the 
sample (adjusted to 2011 dollars) is roughly $5,900 (covering 
1980–2006 spending rates), with a standard deviation of roughly 
$2,100.188 The mean HMO-penetration rate over the sample  
period is roughly 13.2 percent with a standard deviation of 
roughly 11.7 percent. 
The above specification treats variations in HMO-
penetration rates across regions linearly. In an alternative ap-
proach,189 I estimate a more nonparametric specification, in 
which I group observations into one of twenty different HMO-
penetration bins and then interact dummy variables for each of 
these bins with the damage-cap variable, which allows for ob-
servation of how the impact of statutory rape laws on Medicare 
spending itself varies as HMO-penetration rates increase over 
time. This alternative approach suggests a big jump in the sen-
sitivity of spending to liability forces when moving from no HMO 
penetration to some HMO penetration (that is, when moving out 
of the first bin), and another round of jumps in this sensitivity 
when moving into the bins with very high HMO-penetration 
rates. 
 
 188 See Table 1. 
 189 Results are available from the author upon request. 
